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In this paper we model the revenue that could be raised from an annual and a one-off wealth tax 
of the design recommended by Advani, Chamberlain and Summers (2020b). We examine the 
distributional effects of the tax, both in terms of wealth and other characteristics. We also 
estimate the share of taxpayers who would face liquidity constraints in meeting their tax 
liability. We find that an annual wealth tax charging 0.17% on wealth above £500,000 could 
generate £10 billion in revenue, before administrative costs. Alternatively, a one-off tax 
charging 4.8% (effectively 0.95% per year, paid over a five-year period) on wealth above the 
same threshold, would generate £250 billion in revenue. To put our revenue estimates into 
context, we present revenue estimates and costings for some commonly-proposed reforms to 
















The Wealth Tax Commission studied the possibility of a wealth tax for the UK (Advani, 
Chamberlain and Summers, 2020a,b), and delivered a body of research into the desirability and 
deliverability of such a tax. A crucial aspect for politicians in deciding whether or not to support 
a tax on wealth is how much revenue it could raise. Meanwhile, public support will hinge at least 
partly on how much people could be asked to pay.  
In this paper we model the revenue that could be raised from an annual and a one-off wealth tax. 
We first consider an annual wealth tax, and calculate the tax rates that would be needed to raise 
£10 billion in revenue at various possible thresholds, taking into account likely behavioural 
effects. We analyse the distributional effect of these tax structures in terms of who pays and 
how much, both across the wealth distribution and across other characteristics. We also analyse 
who is likely to face liquidity constraints. For some of these tax structures, we look at how the 
revenue raised compares to the administrative burden, both for the government and the 
taxpayer.  
We find that a wealth tax could raise a substantial amount of revenue at relatively modest tax 
rates. For an annual wealth tax, a flat tax of 0.17% on wealth above £500,000 could generate 
£10 billion in revenue, but at a (proportionally) high ongoing administrative (admin) cost to 
government of £1.2 billion. The admin costs to taxpayers are even higher, at £7.8 billion per year, 
increasing substantially the effective tax rate inclusive of all taxpayer costs. At higher 
thresholds, higher tax rates are required to generate a similar amount of revenue, but aggregate 
admin costs are lower as there would be fewer taxpayers. For example, at £2 million the ongoing 
admin costs to government fall to only 1% of the revenue raised, comparable with other major 
taxes (HMRC, 2019).  However, with a £10 billion revenue target, costs to the taxpayer amount 
to a quarter of revenue raised. This effectively adds a cost of 0.13% of wealth to the headline 
rate. 
We then consider a one-off wealth tax. Since this is a one-off event, certainly not something that 
would be seen for at least another generation, we consider the tax rate needed to raise £250 
billion: the equivalent of raising an effective annual revenue of £10 billion per year over a 25-
year period. We also consider a flat rate of 1% a year for five years, as an alternative benchmark. 
We perform an analogous set of analyses, studying distributional effects, liquidity constraints 
and admin costs.  
We find that a one-off wealth tax charging a tax rate of 4.8% on wealth above £500,000 would 
generate £250 billion in revenue, before admin costs. This would come at a total cost of £1.7 
billion to the government, and £7.8 billion to the taxpayer. Since this is a one-off event, it is 
possible to achieve a much higher ratio of revenue to cost than under an annual wealth tax. A 
higher threshold would reduce the admin cost further, though achieving the same amount of 
revenue would necessitate higher rates. We estimate that with a threshold of £1 million, a one-
off tax of 8.5% – or a five-year annualised rate of 1.7% – would be required to raise £250 billion. 
Under this tax structure, the cost to the government would be 0.4% of the revenue raised. 
Taxpayer costs would be 1.8% of revenue raised, effectively adding a further 0.14% to the 
headline rate. 
Under a one-off wealth tax with an exemption threshold of £500,000 generating £250 billion in 
revenue, we estimate that 6.4% of individuals would face liquidity constraints. This rises to 25% 
with a threshold of £2 million, though the absolute number of liquidity constrained taxpayers 
would fall, from 526,000 to 154,000. Fewer taxpayers would be liquidity constrained under an 




Finally, we compare the revenue we could get from a wealth tax with the revenue that might be 
raised by alternative reforms to the taxation of capital: in particular reforms to Capital Gains 
Tax (CGT), taxation on dividend income, Inheritance Tax (IHT), and Council Tax. Numerous 
reforms to these taxes have been proposed in recent years (APPG, 2020; Adam, Hodge, Phillips 
and Xu, 2020; Corlett, 2018; Roberts et al., 2018). We focus on a few headline reforms that are 
common to almost all reform proposals.  
A brief comparison shows that it would be possible to raise similar amounts of revenue to an 
annual wealth tax, or more, through some of the proposed reforms we examine. For example, 
raising tax rates on capital gains to be in line with those on income would raise an additional £12 
billion, with little implied cost to tax authorities, and equalising rates on dividends would raise 
around £5 billion. On the other hand, a reform such as revaluing housing assets (and reforming 
rates) for Council Tax could raise even more substantial amounts, for around half the one-off 
cost to the government of implementing an annual wealth tax. These alternative reforms do not 
necessarily avoid some of the challenges inherent in implementing a wealth tax, such as the cost 
and difficulty of valuing assets.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data we use and 
adjustments we make to better capture wealth held at the top. Section 3 presents our revenue 
modelling for an annual wealth tax, who would pay it, and how many taxpayers would face 
liquidity constraints. We also discuss the effect of banding on our revenue estimates. Section 4 
presents similar analysis to Section 3, this time for a one-off tax on wealth. Section 5 provides a 
brief analysis of the revenue that could be raised from alternative reforms to the current tax 














2. Data and Methods  
2.1 Data 
Wealth and Assets Survey 
Our primary data source is the Office for National Statistics’ (ONS) Wealth and Assets Survey 
(WAS), which is the most comprehensive data source on wealth in the UK. We use the most 
recent wave of the data, collected in 2016–18, which covers around 40,000 individuals. The data 
exclude certain geographical regions, in particular Northern Ireland, and the area north of the 
Caledonian Canal. Individuals living in institutional settings, such as care homes, halls of 
residence, and prisons, are also beyond the scope of the survey. As a result, we miss around 2% 
of the UK population. 
The WAS collects information on all major asset classes, including pensions, property, physical 
wealth (consumer durables), financial wealth, and business assets, as well as liabilities. 
Consumer durables are not included in the UK National Balance Sheet, which is constructed 
following the System of National Accounts. However, physical assets such as vehicles, art 
collections, antiques etc. are important household assets, and can be significant stores of value 
for individuals at the top of the wealth distribution. We therefore include these assets in our 
wealth definition. To construct a measure of 'net wealth', we deduct the value of loans including 
mortgages, consumer loans, outstanding balances on credit cards and store cards, outstanding 
balances on hire purchase agreements and mail order purchases, arrears on household bills and 
loans, and current account overdrafts. We use this net wealth concept to calculate an 
individual's tax liability.  
In principle, we would like to include in our definition of tax-deductible loans any loan that has 
been made legally binding, including formal loans between family and friends. Informal loans for 
which there is no legal contract could be used for tax avoidance purposes if they are not tax 
deductible. However, in practice such loans cannot be distinguished from gifts, and we do not 
consider it feasible to include them in the tax base. Unfortunately, the WAS does not distinguish 
between inter-household loans that have a formal legal contract, and those that do not. In our 
main measure of taxable net wealth, we do not deduct 'loans from a friend, relative, or other 
private individual' from an individual's gross wealth, effectively treating them all as informal. 
Similarly, we exclude money loaned to other individuals from an individual's financial assets. The 
revenue effect of excluding these informal loans is insignificant - in the tens of millions for a one-
off wealth tax raising £250 billion in revenue.  
For our purposes, the valuation concept of interest is market value – the amount for which 
assets could be sold. The WAS measures all assets that are relevant to our definition of the tax 
base at market value. The exception is household contents, which we address in detail below. 
These are recorded at replacement cost, which is likely to be significantly higher than the 
amount for which household items could be sold second hand. 
Our revenue modelling assumes a comprehensive tax base, covering each of these asset classes, 
net of debts. Advani, Chamberlain and Summers (2020b) argue, however, that a wealth tax may 
need to allow exemptions for low-value assets, and suggest a £3000 exemption per item. We 
aim to define chargeable wealth – wealth that could be taxed – to be consistent with this. It is 
not possible to model this precisely using the WAS, as wealth is not reported item-by-item, so 




For physical wealth, we start by excluding the value of all household contents. The questionnaire 
is structured such that collectibles and valuables are asked about before the value of any other 
household contents. Respondents are then instructed to "include all items, such as appliances 
and electronic equipment, furniture, clothing and leisure items (but exclude any vehicles or 
collectibles and valuables that you have already told me about)". Items worth more than £3000 
are likely to have already been included under collectibles and valuables. However, it is possible 
that some larger appliances and items of furniture would be worth more than £3000. To 
examine the likelihood of this, we analyse eBay sales data to obtain the average sale price of new 
and used household items, where we think of the new price as a proxy for replacement cost, and 
the used price a proxy for market value. Table F1 shows the average price for a range of 
narrowly-defined household items which might be included under the WAS household contents 
category. All items are worth far less than £3,000 on average, even when new, and very few 
items sell for more than £3,000. We interpret this as evidence that the majority of household 
contents will be exempt from the wealth tax. In Appendix F, we show that the revenue effects of 
including household contents are small, primarily because these assets are concentrated at the 
bottom of the wealth distribution. This is important, as it suggests that the revenue implications 
of taxing these assets will be small relative to the hassle cost of valuing them. 
For categories likely to include items worth more than £3000, such as collectables and 
valuables, vehicles, and personalised number plates, we exclude this wealth only if the total 
amount reported in that category is less than £3000. We apply the latter rule to property wealth 
(treating each category separately),1 and business assets (treating each business separately). 
For pensions, we apply the £3000 rule to the category as a whole. We deduct the full value of 
any debts. We do not allow an exemption on financial assets, as it is unlikely that such a rule 
would be implemented in reality.  
We use individual-level, rather than household-level data, to be consistent with the 
recommendation of individuals as the tax unit in Advani, Chamberlain and Summers (2020b). 
Most of the wealth recorded in the WAS is captured at individual level. For wealth recorded at 
household level, which includes the main residence and certain categories of physical wealth 
such as household contents, we divide the wealth equally between the head of household and 
their partner, where applicable.  
For our liquidity analysis, we use the concept of 'net income' as captured in the WAS, which is 
measured at the individual level. This includes income from employment, self-employment, 
state benefits, occupational and private pensions, investment income, and other regular income 
(such as from friends and family, maintenance, royalties, overseas pensions, and rent), net of any 
tax and National Insurance contributions paid by the individual. This income concept is broader 
than fiscal income, which only captures income that is assessable for tax. It is less comprehensive 
than income as recorded in the national accounts, which also includes income flows not directly 
received by individuals, such as the imputed rent of owner-occupiers and investment income 
received by pension funds. For the purpose of analysing liquidity constraints, it is important to 
consider income flows which an individual could use in practice to fund wealth tax payments. 
Including income flows such as imputed rents would understate the liquidity issues faced by 
those living in valuable residential properties, for example. The income definition we use is 
consistent with the liquidity analysis presented in Loutzenhiser and Mann (2021).  
 
1 Property wealth is divided into main residence, second homes, buy to let property, other buildings, UK 




Sunday Times Rich List 
A key caveat to relying on the survey data alone is that they under-represent wealth held at the 
very top of the distribution. In response to this, we follow the approach set out in detail in 
Advani, Bangham and Leslie (2021), which supplements the WAS with information from the 
Sunday Times Rich List (STRL). We make a few adjustments to this methodology, as described 
below.  
The STRL captures, in theory, the 1000 richest people or families in Britain. The compilation and 
measurement of wealth held by rich list individuals draws heavily on their observable business 
assets. More private forms of wealth, such as financial assets, are generally not captured. We 
proceed under the assumption that the wealth captured primarily reflects business wealth, and 
that the total wealth recorded is likely to be an underestimate of the wealth held by these 
individuals.  
Though there are 1000 entries in the STRL, some entries include multiple individuals, such as a 
husband and wife or other members of the same family. To be consistent with our use of 
individual-level data in the WAS, we treat each individual named in the STRL as a separate unit. 
Where there are multiple named individuals per rich list entry, we divide wealth equally among 
them.  
In contrast to Advani, Bangham, and Leslie (2021), we use data from the 2020 STRL. We rescale 
this to match the aggregate wealth in the 2017 and 2018 (average of the two) lists, to be 
consistent with the time period in which the WAS data were collected. Our reason for doing this 
is to leverage information on the country of residence of STRL individuals, which we obtain using 
matched records from Companies House. Individuals need not have the UK as their main 
country of residence to be included in the STRL, and it is not clear that all individuals would 
qualify as resident for tax purposes. This is important for our revenue analysis, as we seek to 
establish how much revenue could be raised from those who are likely to be eligible to pay.  
Though tax residence is not a readily observable characteristic, we can proxy for this using 
information on country of residence as recorded in the Companies House register. Most 
individuals in the STRL own or control part of a company registered with Companies House, and 
these companies are required to submit information on their directors or ‘persons with 
significant control’, including information on their usual country of residence.2 We have 
matched individuals named in the STRL to Companies House records, using name and date of 
birth as our matching criteria. We were able to match 83% of the 1,242 named individuals 
automatically. A further 149 were matched manually, having been missed often as a result of 
different variants of their name being used across the two data sources. For the remaining 
unmatched 5% of individuals, we impute information on their country of residence based on the 
percentage of individuals in each five-percentile bin of the STRL who are UK resident. In total, 
we classify 84% of individuals as UK resident, although they make up only 74% of the wealth in 
the STRL.  
2.2 Pareto Imputation 
We account for wealth missing from the top of the distribution in two ways. First, we add 
individuals in the STRL to our WAS data, removing the handful of individuals whose wealth 
overlaps with the STRL to ensure they are not accounted for twice. Second, as in Advani, 
 
2 A 'person with significant control' is usually someone who (a) owns more than 25% of shares in the 
company; (b) holds more than 25% of voting rights in the company; or (c) holds the right to appoint or 




Bangham, and Leslie (2021), we implement a Pareto adjustment to estimate the amount of 
additional wealth that should be captured in the top tail of the wealth distribution. The first step 
increases our estimate of total wealth from £14.2 trillion to £14.6 trillion. The second step 
increases this to £14.8 trillion. 
It is widely observed that the top tail of the wealth distribution approximates a Pareto 
distribution (e.g. Jones, 2015). By fitting a Pareto distribution using data on wealthy individuals 
in the WAS combined with the STRL, we estimate the amount of excess wealth that is implied by 
the shape of the distribution. We refer the reader to Advani, Bangham and Leslie (2021) for full 
details of this approach. 
We implement our Pareto adjustment to the distribution of business wealth (including shares), 
rather than using total wealth as recorded in the WAS. This is to ensure consistency with what 
is captured in the STRL, which we believe to be primarily business wealth. We choose a relatively 
low threshold of £500,000 in business wealth, though in practice the chosen threshold has little 
impact on the amount of additional wealth estimated. Using this approach, we estimate that 
there is an additional £280 billion in wealth in excess of the wealth recorded in the WAS and the 
STRL. This differs from the estimate in Advani, Bangham and Leslie (2020) for two reasons. First, 
their paper uses household, rather than individual-level data to implement the Pareto 
adjustment. Second, they assign each entry in the rich list a single household weight of 1, 
whereas we assume each entry represents the number of individuals explicitly named in the rich 
list. 
To estimate the amount of revenue that could be raised from individuals across the wealth 
distribution, we must allocate this additional Pareto wealth to observations in our data. We do 
this by assigning to each individual in our Pareto sample the amount of business wealth they 
would be expected to have according to their rank in the distribution. We then redefine each 
individual’s total market value wealth, and total chargeable wealth, replacing their reported 
business wealth with the amount implied by the Pareto distribution.  
For the purpose of analysing liquidity issues, it is essential to know how an individual’s 
chargeable wealth compares to their income. However, by adjusting wealth at the top of the 
distribution, we have distorted this relationship. It is not clear how one could model a top wealth 
or income adjustment that accurately captures the relationship between these two variables at 
an individual level. Moreover, we do not wish to overstate the extent of liquidity issues by 
assuming that wealth has been under-reported while income is accurately captured. As a result, 
we have chosen to preserve the ratio of wealth to income as it is reported in the survey. We do 
this by scaling net income by the ratio of an individual’s adjusted to unadjusted wealth. At an 
individual level, the ratio of wealth to net income is therefore consistent with the liquidity 
analysis undertaken in Loutzenhiser and Mann (2021). This adjustment makes very little 
difference to our estimates: under each of our proposed tax structures, the percentage of 
taxpayers deemed to be liquidity constrained is within half a percentage point of the result 
obtained when reported income is used.  
In our revenue analysis, we use the WAS data augmented with the STRL and our Pareto 
adjustment. They are also included in our analysis of the distribution of taxpayers by age and 
sex. However, we do not have information on their income, asset composition, or region of 
residence. STRL individuals are therefore excluded from our analysis of the distribution of 




3. Modelling an annual wealth tax 
3.1 Approach 
We model a wealth tax that is consistent with the recommendations outlined in Advani, 
Chamberlain and Summers (2020b) using the data on wealth above various thresholds 
described in the previous section. Our tax covers all adult individuals. Children are not taxed as 
separate tax units. Instead, their wealth is aggregated with the wealth of their parents. We 
assume that, in practice, parents would be able to choose who their children's wealth is allocated 
to, and would do so to minimise their joint tax liability. Accordingly, we allocate children’s’ 
wealth reported in the WAS to the lower wealth parent, splitting any excess equally. In this way, 
we preserve the wealth ranking between parents.  
Though data from the STRL are included in our analysis, in our main specification we exclude 
individuals who are classified as non-residents according to their Companies House records, 
targeting tax residence as the relevant connection criterion. 
We also take into account behavioural responses. As outlined in Advani and Tarrant (2021), a 
net wealth tax is likely to elicit a number of avoidance and evasion responses, including under-
reporting, offshore evasion, gifting and fragmentation, asset portfolio recomposition, saving 
responses, labour supply responses, and migration. Advani and Tarrant (2021) conclude that 
under a well-designed wealth tax covering all asset classes – as we assume ours will – the overall 
magnitude of behavioural responses could be limited to a 7–17% reduction in wealth in 
response to a 1% tax rate on wealth. In our revenue modelling, we take the upper bound as the 
‘high avoidance’ scenario, and the lower bound as the ‘low avoidance’ scenario. We apply this 
response to the average tax rate faced by each individual under each tax structure. For example, 
for an individual facing an average tax rate of 0.5%, we reduce their chargeable wealth by 3.5% 
in the low avoidance scenario. 
The figures 7% and 17% represent average behavioural responses, summarising the combined 
effect of each individual’s response along the different margins. By applying this statistic in the 
way we do, we will miss heterogeneity in avoidance responses across individuals. In practice, 
some individuals will respond much more than others, and they will respond along different 
margins. For example, these statistics partly reflect migration responses. Rather than modelling 
who will choose to migrate and who will stay, we attribute the reduction in aggregate wealth 
arising from some migration, to a reduction in the wealth of all individuals. In doing so, we 
assume that behavioural responses are uniformly distributed across the wealth distribution. 
While this may not hold in practice, we currently have very little empirical evidence on the 
distribution of behavioural responses to a wealth tax (Advani and Tarrant, 2021). If the wealth 
tax were at a flat rate (above some threshold), any heterogeneity would not affect our revenue 
estimates. If the tax were progressive, our revenue estimates could be affected; however, in the 
absence of information on how behavioural responses are distributed, it is not possible to even 
sign the direction of the effect. In our distributional analysis, we focus on who should pay the tax, 
and how much they should pay, rather than the amount they would pay after taking behavioural 
responses into account. This will be unaffected by our method of accounting for behavioural 
response in our revenue calculations.  
Using household-level data we can explicitly model the potential revenue effects of asset 
splitting between spouses. In addition to our core revenue estimates, which account for 
avoidance using the elasticities provided in Advani and Tarrant (2021), we estimate the amount 
of revenue that would be raised if all assets excluding pensions were split equally among the 




transferred across individuals. We compare this to the revenue that would be raised if 
ownership among spouses were unaffected by the introduction of a wealth tax. In doing so, we 
assume no other avoidance responses. This is because our overall estimate of 7-17% already 
accounts for asset splitting, and it is unclear what proportion of this average elasticity can be 
attributed to asset splitting relative to other responses. 
To calculate net revenue, we estimate the admin costs that the taxpayer and the tax authority 
would face on an ongoing basis. Admin costs to the taxpayer partly reflect the valuation costs to 
taxpayers which are likely to need professional valuations for their asset portfolios. A range of 
cost estimates are calculated in Daly, Hughson, and Loutzenhiser (2021); here we estimate a 
‘central’ scenario based on valuation costs amounting to 0.4% of the value of hard-to-value 
assets (with the same overall cap). 
Evidence presented by Burgherr (2021) suggests that there is also a fixed cost of filing which, 
while generally dwarfed by the valuation cost, should be accounted for. We add a £2000 cost 
for all taxpayers with hard-to-value assets, reflecting a central estimate from the range he 
establishes; we do not attempt to account for the opportunity cost of the taxpayer’s time for 
those taxpayers who (we assume) do their own filing. These estimates also do not attempt to 
account for legal costs of disputes with the tax authority, as the scale and variation of these costs 
are much less predictable. The valuation cost estimates cover a single year of a tax and do not 
depend on the tax rate, nor do they vary between a one-off tax and an annual tax; in an annual 
tax scenario with valuation only necessary every few years, costs could be expected to be lower 
after the initial valuation.   
We also calculate the one-off costs that the tax authority would incur in order to administrate 
the tax. Our ongoing admin costs are based on the cost to HMRC of auditing Self Assessment 
(SA) income tax returns. A wealth tax would be administered in much the same fashion, with 
potential taxpayers having to submit a tax return, a certain percentage of which would be 
audited by the tax authority. We assume that the cost of auditing a wealth tax return will be the 
same as the cost of auditing a SA return, which is approximately £2,500 per audit (Advani, 
Elming and Shaw, forthcoming). We will assume that 5% of wealth tax returns are audited, 
suggesting that the average cost per tax unit to HMRC from auditing is around £125. To 
calculate the total ongoing admin cost for each tax structure, we multiply this figure by the 
number of filers, assuming that anyone who thinks they are within 10% of the tax threshold also 
has to file a tax return. This means that the population of returns that could potentially be 
audited will be slightly higher than the number of taxpayers.  
There are two types of one-off cost we consider. First, the cost of revaluing residential property, 
which we assume is done centrally rather than by the taxpayer, as is the case for Council Tax. 
Second, the cost of designing and developing an IT system for administering the tax.  
For the cost of revaluing residential property, we draw on the estimated cost of revaluating 
properties for Council Tax in England, a project which began in 2001 but was never completed.3 
In 2005 it was estimated that the revaluation would cost the Valuation Office Agency (VOA), 
which was tasked with conducting the revaluation, £139.3 million in total.4 An additional £38 
million was expected to be incurred in the first year from the cost of appeals. At this point, £45 
 
3 The revaluation exercise was due to be completed in April 2007 and would have been the first 
revaluation since 1991. However, the exercise was postponed until it could happen ‘…as part of a fully 
developed package of funding reforms, rather than as a precursor to them, and at a moment of greater 
financial stability for local authorities’ (House of Commons Library Research Paper, 2005). 
4 House of Commons Library Research Paper 05/73, ‘The Council Tax (New Valuation Lists for England) 




million had already been spent on bringing the VOA’s systems up to date and digitising 
documents of paper records, an exercise which would not need fully repeating if the revaluation 
were resumed. Since these old documents may now partly be out-of-date, we take a 
conservative approach by assuming that this cost would again be incurred in full. On this basis, 
the exercise would have cost £180 million according to estimates from 2005. Scaling this to 
2018 (the final year in our wealth tax data) by the rate of wage inflation, the most relevant cost 
here, suggests that a present-day valuation would cost approximately £245 million.  
We assume that this £245 million would be the cost of revaluing the entire housing stock. It is 
possible that some fraction of this cost would be avoided, as not all properties would need to be 
valued under a wealth tax with an exemption threshold. However, we do not know what this 
fraction would be. Moreover, valuing properties at the top end of the property distribution is 
likely to be much more costly than valuing a standard semi-detached house, and so we cannot 
assume that the cost of revaluing the housing stock is proportional to the number of houses 
valued. This is certainly not the case, as there will be fixed costs in producing a model for 
estimating house values which would serve as the primary basis of valuation for the majority of 
properties. Our cost estimate should therefore be thought of as an upper bound.  
As a proxy for the cost of building a new system for administering the tax, we take the cost of 
designing and developing the Customs Declaration Service, a system which went live in 2018. 
The system will ultimately process over 250 million customs declarations, calculating the tariffs 
due on each. The most recent estimate of the total cost of the project is £334 million.5 This is a 
comprehensive estimate which includes the cost of planning, designing, construction and 
delivery, as well as ongoing maintenance costs.  
3.2 Revenue 
In this section we present estimates of combinations of rates and thresholds which would raise 
£10 billion in tax revenue under a low avoidance scenario, before accounting for admin costs 
(Table 1). This revenue target is not chosen to in any way be optimal, or reflect any kind of 
recommendation. Instead it is selected as a useful benchmark, being roughly equivalent to 
increasing the basic rate of income tax by 2p (HMRC, 2020a).  
With a threshold of £10 million, a tax charged at 1.1% would raise £10 billion under a low 
avoidance scenario, or £8.8 billion with high avoidance. Ongoing admin costs to government 
here are essentially negligible, although there is some setup cost that is needed.  
Lowering the threshold to £2 million, the same amount could be collected with a tax rate of just 
0.57% under a low avoidance scenario. Now the number of taxpayers is substantially higher, 
increasing from 22,000 to 631,000. The aggregate admin costs of the tax would be much higher 
– the cost being largely borne by the taxpayer rather than the government.6  Costs to the 
taxpayer amount to a quarter of revenue raised, effectively adding a cost of 0.13% of taxable 
wealth to the headline rate.7  
 
5 HMRC Government Major Project Portfolio data, September 2019. 
6 Note that for purposes of Total Managed Expenditure calculations, the admin cost to government can 
likely be reduced by around one-third, since these costs are largely salaries, and one third of this cost will 
be returned to the exchequer in income tax and national insurance contributions. However, the full value 
of the cost must be taken into account when considering the efficiency of the tax.  
7 This figure is calculated by dividing the aggregate admin cost to taxpayers by aggregate wealth above 




At 22,000 taxpayers, the volume of taxpayers under an annual wealth tax beginning at £10 
million is similar to IHT (which covers 24,000 taxpayers per year). Comparable amounts could 
be raised with a progressive tax, covering the same number of taxpayers but at lower rates for 
those with less wealth, as shown in one particular example in the final row of Table 1. 
With a threshold of £500,000, 8% of the revenue raised comes from individuals in the STRL. 
The importance this group becomes more pronounced the higher the threshold: with a 
threshold of £5 million, these individuals account for 40% of our revenue estimate. This 
























      
10,000,000  
1.12
%           10.0               8.8                22                0.7  0.6      0.003  50% 
        
5,000,000  
0.90
%           10.0               9.0                83                1.4  0.6        0.01  40% 
        
2,000,000  
0.57
%           10.0               9.4              631                2.5  0.6          0.1  25% 
        
1,000,000  
0.31
%           10.0               9.7           3,035                4.6  0.6          0.5  14% 
           
500,000  
0.17
%           10.0               9.8           8,240                7.8  0.6          1.2  8% 
           
250,000  
0.12
















Notes: The rates target £10bn in revenue, taking into account a low level of avoidance, and before the deduction of 
admin costs.  
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey, 2016–18; Sunday Times Rich List, 2020; Burgherr, 2021; Daly, Hughson, 
and Loutzenhiser, 2021; House of Commons Library, 2005; HMRC Government Major Project Portfolio data, 2020d. 
The amount of revenue raised by a tax with a given threshold can be varied by changing the 
rates. Figure 1 illustrates the rates that would be required to raise different revenue targets, net 
of ongoing admin costs to government. Evidently, the rates required to generate a given amount 




FIGURE 1: RATES AND THRESHOLDS GENERATING DIFFERENT REVENUE TARGETS FROM AN ANNUAL 
WEALTH TAX, AFTER ADMIN COSTS 
 
Notes: Tax rates are those required to generate the revenue target after admin costs are taken into account. 
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey, 2016–18; Sunday Times Rich List, 2020. 
To understand the potential revenue effects from asset splitting, we model the revenue that 
would be raised if all assets, other than pensions, were split equally between the household head 
and his/her partner. Using the headline rates presented in Table 1, we first estimate the revenue 
that could be raised if assets were retained by the household member who owns them currently 
(Table G1). In the absence of any avoidance responses, revenue would be up to £0.9 billion 
higher than in our low avoidance scenario. However, if households were to respond to the tax 
by splitting their assets equally, revenue would be reduced by 1-7% (up to £0.7 billion). Note 
that this revenue loss is smaller than the revenue loss obtained by moving to our 'low avoidance' 
scenario.  Our 'low avoidance' measure is intended to be comprehensive of the range of 
behavioural responses available to individuals. It is reassuring to find that the revenue loss from 
asset splitting – even when modelled to the extreme – is lower than our more optimistic measure 
of avoidance responses, particularly as asset shifting is a known response to individual taxation 
(Advani and Tarrant, 2021).  
3.3 Distributional Effects 
If the UK were to introduce an annual wealth tax, who would pay it? And how would the amount 
of tax paid vary across individuals? In this section, we explore how tax liabilities would vary 
across the distribution of income and wealth under each of the annual tax structures presented 
in Table 1, assuming the rates required to generate £10 billion before admin costs under a low 
avoidance scenario. We then consider the characteristics of taxpayers, specifically considering 
age, sex, and region. We include individuals in the STRL when looking at the distribution by 
wealth, age and sex. However, as we have no information on their income nor region of 
residence, this analysis is based on the WAS data only.  
Table 2 shows the amount of tax paid by a representative individual with different levels of 
wealth. A higher threshold does not necessarily mean that an individual who is still liable to pay 




example, the tax liability that this individual faces is £20,150 under a flat tax starting at £1 
million. If the threshold rises to £2 million, the rate required to generate the same amount of 
revenue as before means that the same individual would now face a tax liability of £31,350.  
An exemption threshold of £250,000 would not charge any wealth tax to anyone in the bottom 
70% of the wealth distribution. Nevertheless, by international standards this would be a very 
low threshold: only Switzerland is lower (Chamberlain, 2020). With a relatively low exemption 
threshold of £250,000, the average tax rate faced across the wealth distribution would increase 
steadily, reaching 0.12% (equal to the marginal tax rate) for those in the top 1%. With a higher 
exemption threshold, the average tax rate increases more rapidly. Individuals in the top 1% 
would face an average tax rate of 0.21% with an exemption threshold of £2 million, for a tax 
generating £10 billion in revenue (see Fig. 2).  
 
TABLE 2: AMOUNT OF TAX PAID BY A REPRESENTATIVE INDIVIDUAL UNDER AN ANNUAL TAX WITH 
DIFFERENT THRESHOLDS, (£) 
Threshold (£) Rate Individual net wealth (£) 











Flat taxes generating £10bn 
10,000,000 
1.12
%               56,000  
5,000,000 
0.90
%           22,500        90,000  
2,000,000 
0.57
%           5,700      31,350        74,100  
1,000,000 
0.31
%         1,550        6,200      20,150        16,800  
500,000 
0.17
% 425        1,700        4,250      11,900        24,650  
250,000 
0.12
% 600        1,500        3,300        8,700        17,700  


















thousands        1,508           573           107             14                 5  
 
Notes: Calculations of the tax liability of individuals at different points of the wealth distribution, under each tax 
schedule shown in Table 1. 'Number of individuals with similar wealth' shows the number of individuals whose net 
wealth is within 10% of the representative individual, giving a rough indication of the number of individuals who 
would face that tax liability. 





FIGURE 2: MEAN AVERAGE TAX RATE UNDER DIFFERENT ANNUAL TAX STRUCTURES  
 
Notes: All adult individuals are ranked according to their total wealth measured at market value, and grouped into 
percentiles. Tax rates used are as per Table 1. The average tax rate faced by individual is the amount they should pay, 
and does not take behavioural responses into account. We take the democratic mean of average tax rates faced in 
each percentile. Appendix A shows the average tax rate by total chargeable wealth. 
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey, 2016–18; Sunday Times Rich List, 2020. 
On the whole, individuals higher up the income distribution are more likely to pay a wealth tax 
(Fig. 3). However, at each level of income there is some variation in wealth, and not all high-
income individuals have sufficient wealth to become taxpayers. Among those in the top 1% of 
the income distribution, 91% would pay a wealth tax with an exemption threshold of £250,000, 
compared with 25% of the population. As the threshold rises to £2 million, 33% would be liable 
to pay, and at a threshold of £5 million this figure falls to just 8%. Meanwhile, among those at the 
median of the income distribution, 10% would be liable to pay a wealth tax with an exemption 




FIGURE 3: SHARE OF INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE TAXPAYERS UNDER DIFFERENT EXEMPTION THRESHOLDS, 
BY INCOME PERCENTILE 
 
Notes: All adult individuals are ranked according to their net income, and grouped into percentiles. The chart shows 
the percentage of adults in each percentile group who would pay the tax for different exemption thresholds. The 
distribution is independent of the rate chosen, for a given threshold. Individuals in the Sunday Times Rich List are 
excluded from this analysis, as we have no information on their income. We do not show the distribution of taxpayers 
for thresholds above £5 million due to small sample sizes. 
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey, 2016–18. 
Older age groups are significantly over-represented among taxpayers for every threshold 
(Fig. 4). Despite accounting for just 39% of the adult population, adults over the age of 55 
represent 60% of taxpayers when a £5 million threshold applies, rising to as much as 75% with 
an exemption threshold of £2 million. This figure illustrates clearly that the majority of 
taxpayers would actually be of working age, with those in the 55–64 age category being the 
most heavily represented. Only 1–2% of taxpayers are under the age of 35. 
The higher the threshold, the higher the percentage of taxpayers who are male (Fig. 5). For each 
threshold, female taxpayers are in the minority. The gender imbalance is most pronounced 
under a wealth tax starting at £5 million, under which 68% of taxpayers are male. Note that this 
is assuming individuals do not adjust their wealth holdings in response to the tax. For a tax which 
defines the tax unit as the individual, we might expect some asset shifting within couples as a 





FIGURE 4: AGE DISTRIBUTION OF TAXPAYERS UNDER DIFFERENT EXEMPTION THRESHOLDS  
 
Notes: The age distribution of taxpayers above different exemption thresholds is independent of the tax rate. 
Individuals from the Sunday Times Rich List are included in this analysis. 
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey, 2016–18; Sunday Times Rich List, 2020. 
FIGURE 5: SEX DISTRIBUTION OF TAXPAYERS UNDER DIFFERENT EXEMPTION THRESHOLDS 
 
Notes: The gender distribution of taxpayers above different exemption thresholds is independent of the tax rate. 
Individuals from the Sunday Times Rich List are included in this analysis. 
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey, 2016–18; Sunday Times Rich List, 2020. 
The geographical distribution of prospective taxpayers is skewed toward London and the South 
East, regardless of which threshold is chosen. Figure 6 illustrates the distribution of taxpayers 




for 36% of all taxpayers.8 By contrast, just 3% of taxpayers live in the North East. The majority 
of taxpayers live in England; Scotland and Wales account for just 12% of taxpayers. Appendix B 
shows the geographical distribution of taxpayers for alternative exemption thresholds.  
FIGURE 6: GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF TAXPAYERS WITH A £500,000 EXEMPTION THRESHOLD 
 
Notes: This chart shows how taxpayers would be distributed across the country if the tax featured an exemption 
threshold of £500,000. The distribution is independent of the tax rate. Individuals in the Sunday Times Rich List are 
not included in this analysis as we have no information on their region of residence. Appendix B shows the 
geographical distribution of taxpayers using different exemption thresholds. We have no data for Northern Ireland, 
and so the percentages shown are the percentage of taxpayers in Great Britain living in each region. 
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey, 2016–18. 
3.4 Liquidity Issues 
Specific solutions may be required for individuals who face high tax liabilities relative to their 
income, especially if much of their wealth is illiquid. In this section, we illustrate the extent of 
 




liquidity problems faced by individuals under the annual tax structures presented in Section 3.2. 
We ask how many individuals are liquidity constrained under each of the tax structures raising 
£10 billion in revenue, and which groups of individuals are most affected.  
In principle, we may define an individual as being liquidity constrained if, as a result of their 
wealth tax liability, they would be forced to either reduce their consumption and standard of 
living, or maintain their consumption by converting some of their illiquid wealth into cash. 
However, in practice, we do not have a comprehensive dataset which captures income, wealth, 
and expenditure at an individual level. Rather than combining multiple datasets to approximate 
consumption levels at different points of the wealth distribution, we adopt a simpler approach. 
For each tax schedule, we classify an individual as being liquidity constrained if their immediate 
tax liability exceeds 20% of their net income and 10% of their net income plus liquid assets. In 
Appendix C, we illustrate the extent of liquidity issues using alternative cut-offs, to show how 
our estimates change when this definition becomes more or less generous.  
We recognise that a specific solution is needed for the payment of taxes on pension wealth, as 
individuals below State Pension Age (SPA) generally do not have access to these funds. As 
recommended in Advani, Chamberlain and Summers (2020b), a solution to this would be to 
allow individuals below SPA to pay any tax due on their pension wealth out of their lump sum 
once they reach SPA. Accordingly, we assume that once an individual reaches SPA, all of their 
wealth is ‘immediately taxable’. For individuals below the SPA, we define immediately taxable 
wealth as all non-pension wealth, plus the value of pensions that are already in payment, as this 
wealth has already been accessed.9 
We define ‘liquid wealth’ as financial wealth, plus certain forms of pension wealth depending on 
whether the individual is above or below SPA. If the individual is below SPA, we assume that all 
of their pension wealth is illiquid.10 If the individual is above SPA, we assume that any remaining 
wealth in a Defined Contribution pension pot becomes liquid, plus any lump sums from Defined 
Benefit pensions that have not yet been claimed. However, wealth arising from the discounted 
stream of income from a Defined Benefit or annuitised pension pot, or any other form of regular 
pension income, is assumed to be illiquid. 11 In practice, it is difficult to distinguish between liquid 
and illiquid forms of wealth. We expect some of our assumptions to classify too much pension 
wealth as illiquid, but that our classification of all financial wealth as liquid will have the opposite 
effect. It is not clear whether the net effect is positive or negative. 
Of the annual tax structures raising £10 billion in revenue, a flat tax starting at £1 million 
generates the largest number of liquidity constrained taxpayers, with over 48,000 taxpayers 
facing liquidity issues (Fig. 7). Generally speaking, the lower the threshold, the lower the share 
of taxpayers who are liquidity constrained. A flat tax starting at £250,000 generates 32,000 
liquidity constrained taxpayers, representing just 0.2% of taxpayers (Fig. 8). By contrast, though 
the number of liquidity constrained taxpayers is much lower for a tax starting at £5 million, at 
17,000, this accounts for 20.3% of all taxpayers at this threshold. Note that for each tax 
 
9 A 'pension in payment' is one from which an individual is receiving a regular income stream. It is possible 
that there will be some individuals below SPA who have already accessed their pension pot, but are not 
receiving a regular income from their pension. We expect this wealth to be immediately taxable, but are 
unable to include these pensions in our definition of immediately taxable wealth due to data limitations.  
10 It is possible that for individuals deriving a regular income from a pension, some of this wealth is in fact 
liquid. This will not be the case for Defined Benefit payments or income from an annuity, but may be the 
case if the income is being received through a flexible drawdown arrangement. It is not possible for us to 
separate these income streams in order to classify them separately as liquid or illiquid, and so we treat all 
pension in payment as illiquid. This applies to individuals both above and below SPA. 
11 This includes Additional Voluntary Contribution pots that are part of Defined Benefit or hybrid 




structure, we are adjusting the tax rates to target £10 billion in revenue. Therefore, the higher 
the threshold, the higher the marginal tax rate faced by individuals at the top. If we did not adjust 
the rates, then raising the threshold would reduce the number of liquidity constrained 
taxpayers, but this would also reduce revenue. 
Under an annual wealth tax generating £10 billion before admin costs, the majority of liquidity 
constrained taxpayers have a business as their main asset (Fig. 9). The lower the threshold, the 
more evenly spread the composition of assets among those who are liquidity constrained. At a 
threshold of £250,000, 14% of liquidity constrained taxpayers have their main residence as 
their main asset. As the threshold rises to £1 million, this percentage falls to 4%. At higher 
thresholds, business assets become much more important among those who are liquidity 
constrained. At a threshold of £500,000, 57% have a business asset as their main asset. With a 
threshold of £5 million, 94% have a business as their main asset. 
FIGURE 7: NUMBER OF TAXPAYERS ('000) LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINED UNDER TAXES RAISING £10BN IN 
REVENUE, BY RANGE OF NET WEALTH 
 
Notes: An individual is liquidity constrained if their immediate tax liability (defined in Section 3.4) exceeds more than 
20% of their net income and 10% of their net income plus liquid wealth. Tax rates used are as per Table 1. Individuals 
in the Sunday Times Rich List are not included in this analysis. For individuals at the top of the WAS, we use their 
Pareto-adjusted business wealth values, but adjust their net income to maintain the same ratio of wealth to income 
as reported in the WAS. We do not present liquidity analysis using thresholds above £5 million due to small sample 
sizes. The numbers underlying this graph are provided in Appendix C. 




FIGURE 8: PERCENTAGE OF TAXPAYERS LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINED UNDER TAXES RAISING £10BN IN 
REVENUE, BY RANGE OF NET WEALTH 
 
Notes: An individual is liquidity constrained if their immediate tax liability (defined in Section 3.4) exceeds more than 
20% of their net income and 10% of their net income plus liquid wealth. Tax rates used are as per Table 1. Individuals 
in the Sunday Times Rich List are not included in this analysis. For individuals at the top of the WAS, we use their 
Pareto-adjusted business wealth values, but adjust their net income to maintain the same ratio of wealth to income 
as reported in the WAS. We do not present liquidity analysis using thresholds above £5 million due to small sample 
sizes. The numbers underlying this graph are provided in Appendix C. 
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey, 2016–18. 
FIGURE 9: MAIN ASSET AMONG THOSE WHO ARE LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINED UNDER DIFFERENT ANNUAL 
TAX STRUCTURES GENERATING £10BN IN REVENUE 
 
Notes: An individual’s main asset is the largest asset in their wealth portfolio after the exemption of low-value items 
(see Section 2.1 for details). Individuals in the Sunday Times Rich List are not included in this analysis. For individuals 
at the top of the WAS, we use their Pareto-adjusted business wealth values. We do not present liquidity analysis using 
thresholds above £5 million due to small sample sizes. 




3.5 Banding  
Daly, Hughson and Loutzenhiser (2021) discuss in detail the challenges of establishing the exact 
value of a person’s total wealth at a given point in time—a difficult exercise which is nonetheless 
necessary for all taxpayers captured in the flat (or progressive) tax regimes described above. 
One way to address this problem is to use a regime of tax bands, within each of which the tax 
charge is a fixed fee: this will obviate the need for exact valuations of wealth for many 
taxpayers.12 In this section we discuss how revenue raised changes if using a banded regime 
rather than one of the flat tax regimes as discussed above. 
Hughson (2020) addresses many of the issues and challenges in using such a regime as an 
alternative to a flat or progressive tax as described above. A key insight from this work is that a 
banding scheme is a blunt instrument which generates inequity: in a band covering wealth of 
£1–£2 million, someone with £1 million in wealth pays the same amount in tax as someone with 
almost twice as much wealth, and (perhaps substantially) more than someone with just under £1 
million. There is a tension between limiting the extent of this inequity by setting bands narrow 
enough to effectively target wealth, and setting them wide enough to materially simplify the 
reporting burden of a significant proportion of taxpayers.  
We demonstrate an example banding scheme with bands of increasing widths of total wealth: 
£500,000–£1 million, £1–2 million, £2–4 million, £4–8 million, £8–16 million, £16–32 million, 
and £32 million and over. We set the charge within bands based on the midpoint of the band 
(multiplied by a rate of 0.17%, for comparability with a flat tax starting at £500,000).13 The 
charge for the (open-ended) top of the band is set with reference to 150% of the threshold. 
Figure 10 demonstrates what such a scheme would imply in terms of the effective average tax 
rate (EATR) paid – that is, the relevant banding charge divided by an individual’s total wealth. 
The amount of tax paid under the banded regime is equal to the flat tax (only) at the midpoint of 
each band, and the band thresholds are clearly traced out at the points the EATRs jump higher. 
The vertical inequality created is clear: those at the bottom of each band pay a larger share of 
their wealth in tax than people at the top. The long tail at the right-hand side of the graph 
demonstrates a difficulty plaguing any banding regime: because the wealth distribution has such 
a long, thin tail, it is difficult to design a set of thresholds in which the very wealthiest members 
of society pay anything other than a tiny proportion of their total wealth in tax (especially as 
compared to others at the bottom of the same band, who may pay extremely high rates).  
 
12 The current Annual Tax on Enveloped Dwellings (ATED) regime functions in a similar way, although it 
is only applied to one asset class (property). 
13 Hughson (2020) discusses in some detail the issues involved in the choice of the tax charge within each 
band. A charge based on median wealth in the band would imply lower tax rates throughout and revenues 
closer to the equivalent flat tax regime, but is more difficult to justify for wider and wider bands, as well 




FIGURE 10: EFFECTIVE TAX RATES IN A BANDED REGIME 
 
Notes: Tax liability calculated with reference to the mid-point of the relevant band (£48m for top band); EATR is 
calculated dividing tax liability by total marketable wealth. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The interaction between a banded regime and avoidance is also an important consideration. 
Relative to a flat or even a progressive tax regime, a banded regime creates considerably 
stronger incentives for avoidance for those at the bottom of each band, who have only to reduce 
their reported wealth by enough to fall into the lower band in order to significantly decrease 
their tax liability. As noted in Section 3.1, by modelling an average avoidance response, we miss 
the heterogeneity in responses which is likely here: the incentives for avoidance are sharpened 
around band thresholds and dulled elsewhere. 
Figure 11 demonstrates the interaction between avoidance behaviour and a banding regime: 
the dark line repeats the line from Figure 10 above, showing what the EATR paid should be, with 
no avoidance. In our modelling, avoidance takes a very particular shape: everyone reduces their 
reported wealth; but with bands this only changes the tax liability of those close enough to the 
bottom of each band to fall into the lower tax band, while most others remain in the same band, 
so their tax liability is not affected. The result is that those who should be at the bottom of each 
band pay a lower EATR than those with slightly less wealth just the other side of the threshold. 
Because avoidance behaviour is being applied equally to all taxpayers and ignores 
heterogeneous responses, which in reality would probably see avoidance more focused around 





FIGURE 11: EFFECTIVE TAX RATES AND AVOIDANCE UNDER A BANDING SCHEME 
 
Notes: Tax liability calculated with reference to the mid-point of the relevant band (£48m for top band); EATR is 
calculated dividing tax liability by total marketable wealth. Avoidance calculated as elasticity of 17 applied to the no-
avoidance EATR. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The impact of banding on revenue collected is notable. We compare the £9.8–10 billion raised 
by a 0.17% flat tax above £500,000 with revenue that would be raised by the banded regime 
explored above (which has relatively low, dense bands), and with another possible banded 
regime, with fewer bands but extending much further up the wealth distribution: £500,000–
£2 million, £2–5 million, £5–20 million, £20–50 million, £50–200 million, and £200 million and 
over. The former regime could be conceived of as an attempt to more evenly split numbers of 
individuals, while the latter will do a better job of ensuring that tax liabilities track wealth more 
closely at the very top.  
Table 3 provides a summary of estimated revenues using the two schemes, under the two 
avoidance scenarios outlined in Section 3.1. Unsurprisingly, more revenue is collected under a 
low avoidance than under a high avoidance scenario. However, consistently across either 
banding regime and either avoidance scenario, the revenue collected exceeds that under a flat 
tax. This results from a combination of the pattern demonstrated in Figure 10, where as a result 
of the banding scheme people at the bottom of each band are paying more than they would 
under an ad valorem scheme while those at the top pay less, and the positively skewed 
distribution of wealth, which means that there are many more people at the bottom of each band 
than there are at the top. The difference between the two banding schemes under either 
avoidance scenario highlights how sensitive revenues may be to the exact design of such a 
scheme.  
 
TABLE 3: AMOUNT OF REVENUE RAISED UNDER 0.17% TAX AND £500,000 THRESHOLDS 
Tax structure Rate(s) 
Revenue 





Flat 0.17% (flat tax) 10.0 8,240 
Banded: low bands 0.17% (applied to midpoint) 17.2 8,069 
Banded: wide bands 0.17% (applied to midpoint) 21.5 7,957 
High avoidance 
Flat 0.17% (flat tax) 9.8 8,240 
Banded: low bands 0.17% (applied to midpoint) 16.5 7,845 
Banded: wide bands 0.17% (applied to midpoint) 20.4 7,589 
 








4. Modelling a one-off wealth tax 
4.1 Approach 
As with an annual wealth tax, we use data from the WAS and the STRL on the amount of wealth 
above various thresholds to calculate the revenue that could be raised from a one-off wealth 
tax. Our approach is broadly similar to the one described in Section 3.1. The key difference 
between an annual and a one-off wealth tax is the behavioural response. We assume that a one-
off wealth tax would be based on a predetermined date, providing no scope for real responses 
which reduce an individual’s tax liability.  
The kind of avoidance responses we allow for in our analysis of an annual wealth tax do not apply 
in this setting. However, we may still worry about non-compliance and genuine errors. Though 
individuals cannot reduce their liability by, for example, giving away some of their wealth, they 
could choose not to report it on their tax return, or unintentionally omit it. Troup, Barnett and 
Bullock (2020) estimate that 10% of the revenue from a wealth tax would be lost due to some 
combination of non-compliance and errors in this scenario. The approach we adopt for a one-off 
wealth tax is to calculate the revenue raised based on wealth as it is reported in the WAS/STRL. 
We then reduce the resulting revenue estimate by 10% to reflect the likely tax gap.  
A one-off wealth tax is assumed to generate the same admin costs as an annual tax. The main 
difference is that, whereas for an annual tax it is the ongoing costs which inform the net revenue 
that would be raised going forwards, for a one-off tax there is no distinction between a one-off 
and an ongoing admin cost, as the latter are only incurred once.  
There is no reason to assume that a one-off wealth tax would have to be paid in a single 
instalment, indeed this would be unrealistic. In the subsequent analysis, we often report the 
annualised rate of tax that individuals effectively pay, if payment was allowed over a five-year 
period. For example, an individual facing a flat tax at a rate of 5% would pay 1% per year over 
five years.  
4.2 Revenue 
In this section, we present the amount of revenue that would be raised by a flat tax charging 5% 
on wealth above various thresholds. We also show the combinations of rates and thresholds 
that would be required to generate £250 billion from a one-off wealth tax, before admin costs. 
This is effectively equivalent to raising £10 billion per year over a 25-year period.  
A tax rate of 5% would generate a substantial amount of revenue if charged on wealth above a 
relatively low threshold – £391 billion with a threshold of £250,000. The higher the threshold, 
the less revenue can be raised from a 5% tax. If only wealth above £10 million were charged, this 
would raise £44 billion.  
If the government wished to raise around £250 billion with a one-off wealth tax, it could do so 
with a relatively high threshold of £1 million, but this would imply taxing wealth above the 
threshold at a rate of 8.5% (annualised rate of 1.7%) (Table 4). This tax structure would imply 




exceeds this, amounting to 1.8% of revenue raised, effectively adding a further 0.14% to the 
headline rate.14 
At lower thresholds, lower rates would be possible. Note, however, that raising £50 billion a year 
requires much higher rates than for the earlier annual wealth tax targeting £10 billion. This will 
have implications for the number and composition of those facing liquidity constraints under a 
one-off wealth tax, as discussed in Section 4.4. 







Administrative cost (£bn): Share of 
revenue from 
STRL (£) (£bn) 
to 
taxpayer to govt 
Flat tax at 5% 
10,000,000  1%            44                22  0.7  0.6  50% 
5,000,000  1%            53                83  1.4  0.6  40% 
2,000,000  1%            82              631  2.5  0.7  25% 
1,000,000  1%          147           3,035  4.6  1.0  14% 
500,000  1%          263           8,240  7.8  1.7  8% 
250,000  1%          391         15,537  10.7  2.7  5% 
Flat tax raising £250bn 
1,000,000  1.7%          250           3,035  4.6  1.0  14% 
500,000  1.0%          250           8,240  7.8  1.7  8% 
250,000  0.6%          250         15,537  10.7  2.7  5% 
Progressive taxes raising £250bn 
1,000,000 0.8% 











Notes: These revenue estimates account for 10% of tax revenue being lost to non-compliance.  
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey, 2016-18; Sunday Times Rich List, 2020; Burgherr, 2021; Daly, Hughson, and 
Loutzenhiser, 2021; House of Commons Library Research Paper, 2005; HMRC Government Major Project Portfolio 
data, 2020d. 
Even under a progressive tax, raising the threshold does not necessarily mean that taxpayers 
higher up the wealth distribution pay less (Table 5). Under a one-off tax generating £250 billion 
with a £1 million exemption threshold, a taxpayer with £7.5 million in net wealth pays £116,000. 
By lowering the threshold to £500,000 while maintaining the same revenue target, the same 
individual will pay £84,000. Revenue is maintained by increasing the amount of revenue from 
taxpayers lower down the wealth distribution.  
 
14 Admin costs as a share of tax revenue are calculated using revenue estimates which account for 
evasion. To convert admin costs to taxpayers into an effective headline tax rate, we divide aggregate 




TABLE 5: AMOUNT OF TAX PAID BY A REPRESENTATIVE INDIVIDUAL UNDER A ONE-OFF TAX WITH 
DIFFERENT THRESHOLDS (£)  
Threshold (£) 
Annualised 
rate Individual net wealth (£)     
    750,000 1,500,000 3,000,000 7,500,000 15,000,000 
Progressive taxes generating £250bn 
500,000 0%   
      4,000      24,000    116,000      326,000  
1,000,000 0.80%   
2,000,000 1.60%   
5,000,000 2.40%   
10,000,000 3.00%   
500,000 0.60% 
















thousands        1,508           573           107             14                 5  
 
Notes: Calculations of the tax liability of individuals at different points of the wealth distribution, under each tax 
schedule shown in Table 4. 'Number of individuals with similar wealth' shows the number of individuals whose net 
wealth is within 10% of the representative individual, giving a rough indication of the number of individuals who 
would face that tax liability. 
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey, 2016–18. 
 
Figure 12 shows the different combinations of rates and thresholds that would be required to 
generate different revenue targets from a one-off wealth tax, after admin costs. Naturally, the 




FIGURE 12: RATES AND THRESHOLDS GENERATING DIFFERENT REVENUE TARGETS FROM A ONE-OFF 
WEALTH TAX, AFTER ADMIN COSTS  
 
Notes: Tax rates are those required to generate the revenue target after admin costs are taken into account. We 
assume that 10% of tax revenue is lost to non-compliance. 
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey, 2016–18; Sunday Times Rich List, 2020. 
4.3 Distributional Effects 
Given that taxpayer status depends only on having wealth above the tax threshold, and not on 
the frequency of the tax or rates charged, much of the analysis presented in Section 3.3 also 
applies in the context of a one-off wealth tax. What will differ is the amounts of tax paid by 
different taxpayers.  
In Section 3.3, we showed how the share of wealth taxpayers varies across the income 
distribution for a given threshold. This is the same for a one-off tax, since it does not depend on 
the tax rate charged. Figure 13 illustrates how the annualised average tax rate under a one-off 
tax varies across the wealth distribution. The annualised rates are noticeably higher than for an 
annual wealth tax. The average tax rate paid by someone in the top 1% is 0.8% in each of the 5 
years, compared to 0.15% under an annual wealth tax generating £10 billion in revenue with a 
threshold of £500,000. In Appendix A, we show how the average tax rate varies by total wealth, 
rather than by percentile. Here, it is evident that as wealth increases, the average tax rate 








Notes: All adult individuals are ranked according to their total wealth measured at market value, and grouped into 
percentiles. For each tax structure, the tax rates are adjusted to target £250 billion in revenue, before admin costs, 
as per Table 4. The annualised average tax rate faced by individual is the amount they should pay in each year of the 
five-year payment period, and does not take behavioural responses into account. We take the democratic mean of 
average tax rates faced in each percentile. Appendix A shows the average tax rate by total chargeable wealth. 
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey, 2016–18; Sunday Times Rich List, 2020. 
4.4 Liquidity Issues 
The tax rates required to raise £250 billion in tax revenue from a one-off wealth tax – effectively 
£10 billion per year over a 25-year period – are clearly higher than the rates required to 
generate £10 billion from an annual wealth tax. Under a flat tax starting at £500,000, taxpayers 
would face a tax rate of 4.8% under a one-off tax, or 0.95% per year over a five-year payment 
period. By contrast, the same individual would have to pay 0.17% per year under an annual 
wealth tax. As a result, the number of taxpayers who are liquidity constrained under a one-off 
wealth tax will far exceed the number constrained under an annual tax. 
Figure 14 shows the number of taxpayers that would be liquidity constrained under a wealth tax 
generating £250 billion with a five-year payment period. An individual is liquidity constrained if 
the amount of tax they have to pay in the first of the five years exceeds 20% of their net income, 
and 10% of their net income plus liquid wealth (see Section 3.4 for details).15 In this setting, a flat 
tax starting at £250,000 generates the greatest number of liquidity constrained taxpayers, at 
528,000 (3.4%). Less than 10% of these individuals would be liquidity constrained under an 
annual flat tax generating £10 billion. As a percentage of the number of taxpayers, a flat tax 
starting at £5 million produces the highest share facing liquidity constraints, at 38%. 
 
15 In Appendix C, we illustrate the extent of liquidity issues using alternative cutoffs to define when an 




FIGURE 14: NUMBER OF TAXPAYERS LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINED UNDER TAXES RAISING £250BN IN 
REVENUE, BY RANGE OF NET WEALTH 
 
Notes: An individual is liquidity constrained if their immediate tax liability (defined in Section 3.4) exceeds more than 
20% of their net income and 10% of their net income plus liquid wealth. Tax rates used are as per Table 4, where we 
target £250bn in revenue under each tax structure. Individuals in the Sunday Times Rich List are not included in this 
analysis. For individuals at the top of the WAS, we use their Pareto-adjusted business wealth values, but adjust their 
net income to maintain the same ratio of wealth to income as reported in the WAS. We do not present liquidity 
analysis using thresholds above £5m due to small sample sizes. The numbers underlying this graph are provided in 
Appendix C. 
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey, 2016–18. 
The composition of main assets among those who are liquidity constrained under a one-off 
wealth tax is markedly different than for an annual wealth tax generating £10 billion in revenue 
(Section 3.4), as many more taxpayers are liquidity constrained under a one-off tax generating 
£250 billion in revenue. Business assets still feature prominently as a main asset among those 
constrained, and are the most common main asset among those constrained by a tax with an 
exemption threshold of at least £2 million. However, pension assets are a much more common 
main asset among the liquidity constrained than under an annual tax. With a flat tax starting at 
£500,000, 53% of those who are liquidity constrained have illiquid pension wealth as their main 
asset. For those over State Pension Age, this consists of annuitised and Defined Benefit 
pensions, which are illiquid. For those below State Pension Age, this consists of pensions already 
providing a regular income stream, on which they are expected to pay a wealth tax immediately 




FIGURE 15: MAIN ASSET AMONG THOSE WHO ARE LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINED UNDER DIFFERENT ONE-OFF 
TAX STRUCTURES GENERATING £250BN IN REVENUE  
 
Notes: An individual’s main asset is the largest asset in their wealth portfolio after the exemption of low-value items 
(see Section 2.1 for details). Individuals in the Sunday Times Rich List are not included in this analysis. For individuals 
at the top of the WAS, we use their Pareto-adjusted business wealth values. We do not present liquidity analysis using 
thresholds above £5m due to small sample sizes. 
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey, 2016–18. 
4.5 Banding 
As discussed in Section 3.5 above, a tax regime which utilises tax bands can alleviate the 
valuation challenges for taxpayers, but this can have a large impact on revenue: even with 
relatively tight bands, the revenue collected tends to be higher than that under a flat tax 
equivalent, because the bulk of taxpayers pay more. 
Banding also has a marked impact on revenue in the context of a one-off wealth tax. Even if we 
assume the same response from taxpayers (i.e. reducing wealth above the threshold by 10% to 
reflect non-compliance) as in a one-off flat or progressive tax, the estimated revenue raised is 
over £460 billion rather than £250 billion under a flat tax.16 It is worthwhile explicitly pointing 
out that, in this context, more revenue is not necessarily better: here the additional revenue 
comes from the distortion caused by the banded system, leading to many individuals paying far 
higher tax rates than they would under an ad valorem tax. The costs of valuation would need to 
be extremely high in this scenario to justify such a substantial distortion. 
This could be attenuated to some extent by basing the band charge on a point lower in the band. 
For example, basing the charge on the value a quarter of the way into the band (as opposed to 
the halfway point, the midpoint) reduces the estimated revenue collected to around £390bn.  
That said, our modelling of avoidance behaviour in this scenario is quite mechanical, assuming 
that all taxpayers respond in the same way, by reducing their reported wealth by 10%. Some 
taxpayers fall into a lower band as a result, but for most, their payment will remain the same. 
 
16 This estimate is based on the tightly-banded scheme outlined earlier, with thresholds at £500,000, £1m, 




Clearly, this is unrealistic, as those whose wealth is close to a band lower boundary have 
stronger incentives to respond than those higher up in the band. On net, though, this will only 
partly work against the effect of the high EATRs being paid by individuals at the bottom of each 
band, and will not remove the large variation in EATRs across individuals. 
While it may be desirable to introduce a banding scheme as a response to the difficulty of valuing 
wealth precisely, the invariable result is that some individuals will pay much higher taxes than 
they would under an equivalent flat tax. It is only possible to avoid large distortions in the tax 
burden by having very tight bands. Hughson (2020) shows that the trade-off for this choice is 
the better valuation accuracy needed to avoid large numbers of individuals accidentally mis-
classifying their wealth. In the case of a one-off wealth tax as described above, this might not be 
unreasonable given the recommended design implies performing high quality valuation across 






5. Alternative reforms to capital taxes 
To get a sense of scale for wealth tax revenues, it is helpful to consider the effects of alternative 
reforms that have been proposed. In this section, we provide some evidence on the amount of 
revenue that could be raised from alternative reforms to capital taxes, namely Capital Gains Tax 
(CGT), taxation on dividends, Inheritance Tax (IHT) and Council Tax.  
5.1 Capital Gains Tax 
The current CGT regime raised £8.8 billion in 2019–20 (HMRC, 2020b), but recent estimates 
suggest the amount raised could be almost tripled by equalising the tax rates charged on capital 
gains with that charged on income. Capital gains are afforded a significant tax discount 
compared to earned income which incentivises those who can to take remuneration as gains 
instead of income, meaning that the taxation system does not redistribute remuneration from 
gains nearly as effectively as it does remuneration from income.  
Advani and Summers (2020) show that, by taking advantage of the preferential tax rates 
afforded on capital gains, many of the highest-income earners pay lower rates of tax than those 
on below-average incomes. If everyone with total income and gains over £100,000 paid the 
headline average tax rates on earnings, this would raise a further £12 billion. The Office of Tax 
Simplification (OTS), in their review of CGT, suggested that the same reform could raise around 
£14 billion (OTS, 2020). 
A second substantial reform would be the removal of ‘death uplift’. Currently, any accrued 
capital gains are written off on death. The estate of the individual who dies does not have to pay 
CGT. The inheritor is treated as having a ‘base cost’ (original value of asset against which gain is 
calculated) equal to the value of the asset when they receive it, so when they sell they only pay 
tax on the gains that occur after receipt. This creates strong incentives to delay realising gains, 
so that the gains can be written off.  
The OTS review of CGT proposes moving to a ‘no-gain no-loss’ basis. Here the estate of the 
individual continues not to have to pay the CGT17, but the inheritor now receives the asset at the 
base cost of the previous owner. No CGT is now written off: instead the CGT owed by the 
deceased is paid by the inheritor when the inheritors sells (or otherwise ‘disposes of’) the asset. 
The OTS estimates that this reform will raise only £470–900 million in additional tax revenue in 
the short term. 
The relatively modest sum raised here – at 5–10% the current CGT revenue – is because many 
of the assets passed on will continue not to be sold for some time. The proposed reform also 
retains some lock-in effect for two reasons. First, for inheritors CGT would have to be paid on 
the assets when sold, while the full value is otherwise available to borrow against – this is already 
a problem for the original owner, but the magnitude increases over time. Second, in the absence 
of new reliefs, it discourages inter vivos gift-giving (which would still require payment of CGT).  
A better alternative would be to raise the money when assets are transferred, by treating this 
as a disposal. No-gain no-loss benefits those who have enough wealth that some assets can 
continue to be passed through multiple generations without ever being sold. In principle the 
same revenue will eventually be owed. However, there is a risk that the tax owed on some of 
 
17 There are some complexities in how this is structured, including the implications for IHT, which we do 





these gains gets wiped out by calls for ‘rebasing’ – essentially forgiveness of tax owed before 
some date. Such a proposal made its way in to the OTS review of CGT, on the basis that base 
costs for some assets cannot be found.18  
Moving to a disposal treatment at death is likely to raise £1.6 billion a year, almost 20% of the 
current CGT revenue, and would increase proportionally with the tax rate, on a static calculation 
(inter alia, OTS (2020), showing the long term equilibrium effects of removing uplift at death).  
Removing uplift at death in favour of either of these alternatives would create some 
administrative cost. Although the estate must be valued on death anyway, base costs would now 
also be needed for assets. Assuming all assets are hard to value, and using the estimate from 
Burgherr (2021) that a central estimate of valuation costs is 0.5% of the total value of the asset, 
this would cost an additional £80 million per year.  
5.2 Income Tax rate on dividends 
As noted in Section 5.1, income from different sources is taxed differently, and individuals who 
can arrange their income in different forms can reap substantial tax benefits. For example, many 
individuals at the top of the income distribution receive substantial dividend income (and can 
also claim additional personal allowances on this income), which reduces their tax bill compared 
to receiving the same amount as earned income. 
We consider the effect of raising the dividend rate such that it is equal to the income tax rate 
paid on earnings by individuals. As a very rough exercise, we use data from the Survey of 
Personal Incomes (SPI) in 2016-17, and estimate the additional tax revenue which would be 
raised if dividends were taxed at the same average tax rate as recipients pay on the rest of their 
income and the additional personal allowance removed.19 The estimated effect of this reform 
would be to raise just over £5bn.20  Again, we note these are static estimates, and we caution 
that a more sophisticated analysis taking account of behavioural responses may suggest a lower 
amount of revenue raised. On the other hand, these calculations do not include employee 
National Insurance contributions which are currently due on employment income (but not on 
dividends); including these would result in a larger amount of revenue.  
We use statutory incidence in constructing these estimates, so taxes paid by firms, including 
Corporation Tax and employer National Insurance Contributions, are not accounted for. Advani 
and Summers (2020) show that the opposite extreme – assuming full incidence of these taxes 
on employees – increases the overall level of tax paid, but does not change the incidence across 
the income distribution. 
With no information on wealth available in the SPI it is difficult to comment on the distributional 
impact of such a change with reference to wealth. However, in terms of income, the effect of the 
change would be most notable for additional rate taxpayers with dividend income, who would 
 
18 Given the work done by the Wealth Tax Commission to study valuation issues, we think that difficulty 
getting past asset values is unlikely to be a serious concern. Nevertheless it appears to be a politically 
salient issue, that has led to a proposal that base values be rebased to a value in the year 2000 (OTS, 2020). 
We do not see any merit in such a recommendation, but were it implemented it would clearly affect the 
revenue that would be raised in the short term. 
19 The dividend allowance was £5000 in 2016-17 but has since been reduced to £2000. 
20 Comparable figures are found in Nanda (2019), who estimates that equalising tax on dividends with tax 





pay an average of £3900 extra per year in tax, followed by higher rate taxpayers (£1490 per 
year) and then basic rate (£475 per year).  
5.3 Inheritance Tax 
Inheritance Tax (IHT) is a tax on wealth passing on death. The current tax base is far from 
comprehensive. Pension wealth is exempt from IHT, and reliefs are given on business assets 
(BPR) and agricultural property (APR). The exclusion of these assets from the tax base makes it 
easy for individuals who are flexible in how they hold their wealth to avoid the tax. Regarding 
pensions, the current system creates an unusual incentive for individuals to draw down all other 
wealth in order to pass on their pension pot tax-free to the next generation. This is particularly 
anomalous since pension savings already receive significant tax advantages when saving is being 
done. 
The tax is, in principle, levied on wealth in excess of £325,000, though exemptions also apply, 
notably for estates passing to a surviving spouse.21 The exemption threshold (nil rate band) each 
estate faces in practice depends on what assets it contains and who they are passing on to, as 
certain assets such as the main residence qualify for a higher exemption threshold if they are 
passed on to the direct descendants of the deceased. It also depends on whether or not the 
estate had been inherited from a spouse who did not use up their own nil rate band, as any excess 
can be transferred to the surviving spouse. 
In sum, the multitude of exemptions and reliefs make the current IHT system complex, and the 
tax easy for wealthy and well-advised individuals to avoid. This is evidenced by the fact that the 
effective average tax rate declines from 20% among estates worth more than £8–9 million to 
10% for estates worth more than £10 million (OTS, 2018). 
Numerous reforms to the existing tax system have been proposed. In this paper, we focus on 
two: the removal of APR and BPR, and the inclusion of pensions in the tax base.22 We calculate 
the amount of revenue that could be raised from these reforms using data from the WAS for 
2016–18, comparing this to official estimates of the charges levied on estates passing on death 
in 2017–18, which totalled £4.8 billion.23 
Approach 
The WAS represents a snapshot of the wealth held by the living population, rather than the 
population of estates passing on death. To model the value of estates passing on death, we apply 
age-sex specific mortality rates to individual survey weights in the WAS. That is, within each age-
sex cell, we scale the weights of individuals in that cell to match the number of deaths among 
that group recorded in the ONS’ official UK death statistics for 2018. The aim of this exercise is 
to produce a sample which is representative of those who would die in the year following the 
survey. The resulting sample is not fully representative, since we do not adjust mortality rates 
to reflect the fact that wealthier individuals are likely to live longer than other individuals of the 
same age and sex.  
 
21 Charitable donations are also exempt. 
22 An alternative proposal, which we do not consider here is replacing IHT entirely with a lifetime gifts tax. 
See Corlett (2018), Roberts et al. (2018) and Dolphin (2020) for details.  





Modelling the removal of APR and BPR can only be approximated using these survey data, and 
our estimates are only intended to be illustrative.24 The questionnaire does not allow for the 
construction of wealth totals which map neatly into the eligibility criteria for these reliefs. First, 
agricultural business assets are combined with other businesses in the WAS, making it difficult 
to distinguish between the two reliefs.25 Listed and unlisted shares are also combined into a 
single category, though they are treated differently under BPR.26 We approximate this by 
classifying all shares owned by individuals who only own unlisted shares as unlisted, and all other 
shares as listed. We assume that the former are eligible for BPR, while the latter are not. This 
could lead us to overstate the revenue gains from abolishing BPR, as some shares classed as 
‘listed’ would have already qualified for at least partial relief. On the other hand, it is possible 
that some business assets categorised under the ‘own businesses’ section of the WAS, which we 
assume are eligible for 100% relief, would not qualify currently. 
Our revenue analysis excludes individuals from the Sunday Times Rich List. This is because 
though we believe their recorded wealth primarily reflects business assets, we are not confident 
in assigning the full value of this wealth as qualifying for 100% relief under BPR. Including this 
wealth in the wealth added through the removal of BPR and APR would overstate the revenue 
implications of this reform. We do, however, take into account the adjustment made to business 
wealth owned by WAS individuals through our top wealth adjustment.27 
In modelling the revenue implications of taxing inherited pension wealth, we account for the fact 
that the value of pensions that are inherited differs from the total value of pension wealth held 
by an individual while they are alive. While the value of a Defined Contribution pension pot 
generally remains intact when it is inherited, Defined Benefit pensions and the value of pensions 
that have been annuitised can be worth less to the individual to whom the pension is passed on, 
as they do not usually receive the full amount of income paid to the original recipient. We 
assume that the value of a Defined Benefit pension when passed on is worth 50% of what it was 
worth to the original recipient. Pensions that have already been inherited from a former spouse 
or partner are assumed to cease when the individual who inherited them passes on.  
We cannot accurately model the exemption threshold that each individual in our dataset would 
face, not least because we cannot identify individuals who have inherited some nil rate band 
from a spouse, nor do we know to whom the estate would be passed. This makes it impossible to 
say whether exemptions such as the residence nil rate band, which depends on the relationship 
between donor and donee, should apply. Regarding the spousal exemption, we can assume that 
all individuals who are married when they die would pass their estate to the surviving spouse, 
but we cannot confirm this. As a result of these limitations, the revenue model we implement 
will necessarily be stylised.  
 
24 As we explain, the data we use do not directly map on to the categories available for relief. We also do 
not have the necessary information for the very top of the wealth distribution (which we elsewhere 
impute using the STRL), nor do we have information on the remaining nil rate band that a given individual 
has. Our revenue estimates here therefore have more uncertainty than when modelling a wealth tax. A 
more in-depth analysis of IHT reform is beyond the scope of this work. 
25 Other wealth categories in the WAS, such as property – which includes both residential property and 
land – may also include some assets that would qualify for APR. However, we cannot separate the assets 
that would meet the eligibility criteria from those that would not. To the extent this is a problem, it would 
cause us to overestimate the current revenue from IHT, and underestimate the value of removing APR.  
26 According to the eligibility criteria, unlisted shares qualify for 100% relief, while listed shares qualify 
50% and only if the individual controls more than 50% of voting rights.  
27 We also add in the (unadjusted) wealth of survey respondents who overlapped with the STRL, which 




Our approach makes use of the fact that the current IHT system taxes 4% of all estates passing 
on death. We take this as our target taxpaying population total, N. We then exclude individuals 
who are married when they die, under the assumption that these estates qualify for spousal 
exemption. Finally, we assume that the wealthiest N of the remaining estates are taxed, at a rate 
of 40% (as per the current system), on wealth in excess of the minimum wealth required to be 
among the taxpaying population. This final step amounts to assuming that all individuals face the 
same ‘effective threshold’, when in practice some individuals would face a higher threshold and 
some a lower one.  
As well as calculating the revenue that could be raised from these reforms, it is important to 
consider their administrative cost. We will assume that the average admin cost per taxpaying 
estate, currently £1,450 (Burgherr, 2021), is the same when pensions are included as when they 
are not. While implementing the reform is likely to come at some admin cost, it is possible that 
this will be partially offset by the average complexity of estates brought into IHT being lower 
than the complexity of estates that already face the tax. Overall, we assume that these effects 
offset one another.  
For the removal of APR and BPR, we assume that there is an admin cost to valuing businesses. 
Following our method for calculating taxpayer costs for a wealth tax, we assume that this is a 
fixed percentage of the business value reported in the WAS. We take 0.8% of business wealth – 
the upper bound applied for valuing hard-to-value assets under a wealth tax – for all taxpayers 
with business wealth in excess of £30,000, but assume that the total cost of valuing a business 
cannot exceed £25,000, which Burgherr (2021) suggests is the maximum cost faced in practice. 
This is then added to the current average cost of administering IHT per taxpayer. This is likely 
to be an upper bound, as the cost of valuing businesses will be partially offset by no longer having 
to decide whether or not a business is eligible for reliefs. In this exercise, we are assuming that 
the additional cost of valuing businesses is borne by HMRC. This may not be the case. If 
individuals are required to obtain valuations then this cost would be borne by the taxpayer 
instead, as a cost to the executor that would be able to be taken out of the estate.  
Our main specification does not take avoidance responses into account. It is not clear how 
individuals would respond to these reforms, given that they shut off some of the channels that 
can currently be exploited to avoid IHT, such as passing wealth on through a pension pot or 
business. In Appendix D, we present a specification which assumes avoidance responses that 
are likely to be larger than we would observe in reality, for comparison. The effect of these 
responses on our revenue estimates is small, and does not change our interpretation of the 
results.  
Revenue 
Our stylised approach to modelling the IHT system predicts that with the tax base that exists 
currently, i.e. excluding pensions and business assets, IHT ought to have raised £4.4 billion in 
revenue from individuals passing the year following the WAS survey. This is slightly lower than 
the £4.8 billion charge actually levied on individuals passing on death in 2017–18 according to 
the IHT statistics (HMRC, 2020f). One explanation for this shortfall is that our data under-
represent wealth held at the top of the distribution. While we adjust the data for our wealth tax 
analysis by including the STRL and adjusting business wealth, this is not taken into account in 
our IHT modelling as business wealth is excluded from the tax base and we do not include the 
STRL. A second factor is that we do not observe lifetime gifts made in the seven years prior to 
death, which are also subject to IHT. 
We estimate that including pension wealth in the tax base, keeping the threshold the same, 




of additional taxpayers needing to file) of £18 million, around 0.1% of the additional revenue. It 
is important to note that this, and all other estimates here, are static revenue estimates: they do 
not account for how individuals might respond. We provide some suggestive modelling of this in 
Appendix D. 
An alternative reform which adds businesses (agricultural and other) to the current tax base, 
keeping the threshold the same and not changing the treatment of pensions, would increase 
revenue by 20%, or £900 million, at an additional cost of £5 million.  
Combining the two reforms would yield 61% more revenue, and would cost £23 million more 
than the current system, bringing an additional 12,000 estates into IHT. In proportional terms 
these reforms raise substantial revenue, and at very low admin cost. They also have the benefit 
of not distorting choices of which assets to hold in order to reduce tax liabilities on death. 
However, relative to the amounts that a wealth tax could raise the revenue gains from these 
reforms alone are small.28 Implementing these reforms would involve many of the valuation 
challenges faced under a wealth tax, though – importantly – for much lower volumes of 
taxpayers in any given year. By being paid once (at most) per individual, rather than annually, 
the admin costs are much lower, though the principle of needing to value additional asset classes 
for IHT is not changed.29 
Removing APR, BPR and pensions relief would reduce distortions. Whether a government 
wants to then also have more taxpayers and more revenue is a political choice, rather than 
something which can be judged objectively. We therefore consider two further reforms. 
First, we target the same number of taxpayers as the current system after including pensions 
and businesses. Implicitly this raises the ‘effective threshold’ needed to be a taxpayer. This 
reduces the revenue raised by the reform from £7.1 billion to £5.7 billion, but this is still an 
increase of £1.3 billion on the status quo.  
Second, we estimate the rate that would be needed to raise the same amount of revenue as the 
‘current’ scenario, after a reform that includes all assets in the tax base. The tax rate suggested 
by our model in this scenario is 25%. 
TABLE 6: REVENUE FROM REFORMING INHERITANCE TAX (ILLUSTRATIVE) 
 
28 Corlett (2018) estimates the revenue that could be raised from a different alternative: completely 
replacing IHT with a lifetime receipts tax. Under a tax structure which features a £3000 annual allowance 
per recipient, a £125,000 lifetime allowance, and a flat rate of 15% on lifetime gifts in excess of this, it is 
estimated that £6.9 billion could be raised in the first year of the tax. Over time, the amount of tax revenue 
would increase as some individuals who do not reach their lifetime allowance in year one receive 
additional gifts and inheritances.  
29 As Advani, Chamberlain and Summers (2020b) note, all these asset classes are already valued 











Current IHT tax base               25  583,400  0.40  4.4  36  
adding pension wealth                37  583,400  0.40  6.2  54  





Notes: ‘Current IHT tax base’ shows our stylised model of the current IHT system. The ‘effective threshold’ is the 
amount of wealth required to be among the taxpaying population. The revenue calculation is the rate applied to total 
wealth above the effective threshold. ‘Adding pension wealth’ adds pensions to the current tax base, according to 
their inherited value, keeping the effective threshold fixed. ‘Adding business wealth’ adds businesses and unlisted 
shares to the current tax base, keeping the effective threshold fixed. ‘Adding pensions and business wealth’ combines 
the previous two reforms. ‘Raising the threshold’ takes the tax base as inclusive of all assets (pensions and business 
wealth included) and raises the threshold to maintain the same number of taxpayers as the current IHT system. 
‘Reducing the rate’ calculates the rate required to generate the same amount of revenue as the ‘current’ IHT system 
(our model), from the same number of taxpayers, with a comprehensive tax base.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey, 2016–18. 
Table 7 illustrates how these reforms shift IHT liabilities toward the top of the wealth 
distribution. Taxing all wealth on death at 40%, while maintaining the same number of taxpayers 
by raising the threshold, reduces the average tax paid among taxpaying estates worth 
£650,000–£1 million by more than a third. By contrast, it increases the average tax paid by 
taxpaying estates by 9% for those worth £2–5 million and 13% for those worth more than 
£5 million. 



















Average tax due among 
taxpayers (£) 
           
40,233  
        
132,795  
                 
22,912  
                      
33,754  
  
Number of taxpayers 
('000) 7  10          5  
                              
10  
  Total tax due (£m) 
                  
262  
             
1,337  
                       
121  
                            
340  
£1-2m 
Average tax due among 
taxpayers (£) 
           
95,666  
        
308,497  
                 
77,185  
                      
78,414  
  
Number of taxpayers 
('000) 
                      
6  
                    
8  
                           
8  
                                
8  
  Total tax due (£m) 
                  
535  
             
2,421  
                       
606  
                            
615  
£2-5m 
Average tax due among 
taxpayers (£) 
         
233,747  
        
754,246  
              
255,485  
                    
191,716  
  
Number of taxpayers 
('000) 
                      
9  
                 
10  
                         
10  
                              
10  
  Total tax due (£m) 
              
2,120  
             
7,571  
                    
2,565  
                         
1,924  
£5m+ 
Average tax due among 
taxpayers (£) 
         
719,714  
     
2,154,019  
              
815,394  
                    
547,513  
  
Number of taxpayers 
('000) 
                      
2  
                    
2  
                           
2  
                                 
2  
adding pension and business 
wealth               37  583,400  0.40  7.1  59  
Raising the threshold               25  698,934  0.40  5.7  40  




  Total tax due (£m) 
              
1,169  
             
3,584  
                   
1,357  
                            
911  
 
Notes: Total wealth on death is the wealth that would be taxed under a reformed IHT which includes pension wealth 
and business assets (including agricultural). The reformed taxes are as per Table 6. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey, 2016–18. 
If we lowered the rate to make the reform revenue neutral, but kept the current threshold, the 
average tax liability would be lower than the current system in all wealth bands. However, total 
tax revenue would remain unchanged as the tax liability would be spread across a greater 
number of taxpaying estates. This reform would create greater horizontal equity by taxing 
estates with the same total net worth equally.  
5.4 Council Tax 
Another tax on wealth that regularly receives proposals for reform is Council Tax. Council Tax 
is a tax levied on residential property. The statutory incidence of the tax is on the person 
occupying the property, rather than the owner, although it is important to note that part of this 
cost may be passed on through lower rents. The tax is administered at a local level, with some 
elements of the tax structure set centrally. The charge is based on banded property values, with 
the bands fixed across local authorities. However, local authorities have some freedom in 
setting the tax liability that is paid in each band.  
Residential properties in England have not been revalued for Council Tax since 1991, and the 
current tax bands are based on prices from this period.30 This creates horizontal inequities in the 
current system, with properties that have the same value today being taxed different amounts 
depending on how their value has changed since 1991. A revaluation exercise is almost certainly 
needed, to ensure tax liabilities are based on what the property is actually worth. As discussed 
in Section 3.1, the cost of this exercise to government would be around £245 million. However, 
it is worth noting that the alternative – sticking to 1991 property values – is not without cost: 
currently all newly built properties have to be assessed as if they had been built in 1991, which 
is more likely to be open to dispute than the current value of a property.  
Revaluation need not affect the revenue raised from Council Tax, nor the average tax liability 
households face. If the bands were adjusted to current values, maintaining the same proportion 
of properties in each band, and rates were set the same, the amount of revenue would not 
change (at a national level). All that would change is who pays: properties that have appreciated 
considerably since 1991 would attract a higher liability, while properties experiencing more 
modest growth would see a decline in their tax liability.  
However, there are good reasons why we might want to change the rates paid across different 
tax bands. The current system is highly regressive. The average tax rate paid on a house at the 
midpoint of the lowest Council Tax band is 1.65%.31 By contrast, a house at the bottom of the 
top band attracts an average tax rate of just 0.2%. The regressivity with respect to wealth of the 
current system is evident in Figure 16. This plots Council Tax paid as a share of wealth across 
the wealth distribution, based on data from the WAS. A quarter of households in the 25th 
 
30 Properties in Wales have since been revalued to 2003 prices, and a new band added at the top. 
31 This takes the average tax liability faced by a property in band A across all local authorities. The 
endpoints of the bands are set by central government. Here, we use the revalued bands calculated by 





percentile of the wealth distribution pay more than 2.9% of their wealth in Council Tax. At the 
75th percentile, the average tax rate is 0.23%, with no household paying more than 0.45%.  
A more progressive Council Tax could be achieved by making tax liabilities proportional to 
property values.32 Again, this need not affect the total amount of revenue raised, as rates could 
be set to increase the tax paid at the top of the property distribution and reduce the amount paid 
by those at the bottom. However, bringing the tax rate charged on valuable properties in line 
with rates currently paid on properties at the bottom could raise a significant amount of 
revenue. We model such a reform in the subsequent section.  
FIGURE 16: COUNCIL TAX PAID AS A SHARE OF WEALTH, BY WEALTH PERCENTILE 
 
Notes: ‘Mean’ shows the average (mean) share of wealth paid in Council Tax at different percentiles of the wealth 
distribution. ‘Median’ shows the median share of wealth paid in Council Tax at different percentiles of the wealth 
distribution. ‘XXth percentile’ shows the XX percentile share wealth paid in Council Tax at different percentiles of the 
wealth distribution. All households are ranked according to total household wealth measured by market value and 
divided into percentile groups. Based on Wave 6 (July 2016 to March 2018) of the WAS. Weights are scaled to match 
the full population total.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey, 2016–18. 
Approach 
To model the revenue that could be raised from a more progressive Council Tax based on 
current property values, we draw on evidence from Adam et al. (2020), who model the 
distributional effects of six Council Tax reforms. The first, which we shall use in our analysis, is a 
revaluation reform whereby properties are revalued and placed in one of the current Council 
Tax bands (in England), with the band thresholds adjusted to maintain the same proportion of 
properties in each band. Their estimates suggest that a Council Tax based on revalued property 
values would have the structure presented in Table 8. 
 
32 This would still be distinct from having a wealth tax on property, since Council Tax is set by reference 
to the value of the house someone lives in, not whether they own the house nor how much equity they 




Revaluation alone does nothing to address the regressivity in the system. Under this system, a 
property worth £250,000 is charged 0.62%, while a property worth £10 million is charged just 
0.0035%. We can use these revalued tax bands as a basis for considering a more progressive tax. 
Achieving a more progressive tax does not necessarily mean abolishing the banded system. One 
option for making Council Tax more proportional to property values would be increasing the tax 
rate paid in higher bands, perhaps by setting this with reference to the median or midpoint in 
each band. Adding additional bands would also provide greater capacity for taxing high value 
properties a higher liability than lower valued properties.  
 












 Tax rate 
at lower 
threshold  
 Tax rate 
at 
midpoint  






                    
-    
          
142,000  
                          
1,173  N/a 1.65% 0.83% 24% 
B 
         
142,001  
          
204,560  
                          
1,365  0.96% 0.79% 0.67% 20% 
C 
         
204,561  
          
301,810  
                          
1,558  0.76% 0.62% 0.52% 22% 
D 
         
301,811  
          
415,120  
                          
1,750  0.58% 0.49% 0.42% 16% 
E 
         
415,121  
          
571,050  
                          
2,135  0.51% 0.43% 0.37% 10% 
F 
         
571,051  
          
794,420  
                          
2,520  0.44% 0.37% 0.32% 5% 
G 
         
794,421  
       
1,769,840  
                          
2,923  0.37% 0.23% 0.17% 4% 
H 
      
1,769,841  - 
                          
3,500  0.20% N/a N/a 1% 
 
Notes: Average tax payment is the average across local authorities. The ‘tax rate at lower/upper threshold’ is the 
average tax rate faced by a property at the lower/upper bound of the tax band under the current system. The ‘tax rate 
at midpoint’ is the tax rate faced by a property in the middle of the tax band.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Adam et al. (2020); Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government 
(2019). 
In this paper, we will estimate the amount of revenue that could be raised by reforming Council 
Tax into a continuous progressive tax, under which the tax liability would be set by reference to 
the exact value of the property, rather than by reference to bands. For the purpose of estimating 
the revenue that could be raised from Council Tax reform, this exercise is informative even if 
there is no desire for a system which does away with banding. This is because the amount of 
revenue raised from a fully continuous tax provides a lower bound on the revenue that would 
be raised from a banded system which sets the charge by reference to the median or midpoint 
of the band. Hughson (2020) explains how and why this is also true in the context of a wealth 
tax. The key intuition is that, because the distribution of property values is skewed to the right, 
properties at the lower end of each band attract a much higher average tax rate than the 




To estimate the revenue that could be raised from a continuous and proportional Council Tax 
based on current property values we simply multiply aggregate gross property wealth by the 
desired tax rate.33 We estimate the revenue that would be raised under two alternative reforms. 
The first brings the tax rate in line with the rate paid at the 24th percentile of the currently 
property value distribution under the revalued band system, which is approximately the top of 
band A. A property at this point, worth £142,000, would pay an average tax rate of roughly 
0.83%. The second reform brings the tax rate in line with the average tax rate at the 45th 
percentile of the distribution – the bottom of band C with a property value of around £250,000 
– which is 0.76%.  
Bringing the tax rate faced by all properties in line with the tax rate currently faced by a property 
at the 24th percentile could raise an additional £17.6 billion, at a one-off admin cost of £245 
million (Table 9). Alternatively, charging the rate currently faced by a property at the 45th 
percentile of the distribution could result in a revenue gain of £13.4 billion. 
TABLE 9: REVENUE RAISED FROM COUNCIL TAX REFORM 




(£bn) Revenue gain (£bn) 
Current 0.53 31.8   
Reform 1: tax rate at 24th percentile 0.83 49.4                              17.6  
Reform 2: tax rate at 45th percentile 0.76 45.2                              13.4  
 
Notes: The revenue estimate takes a fixed percentage of the total value of UK housing. Based on Wave 6 (July 2016 
to March 2018) of the WAS. Weights are scaled to match the full population total.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey, 2016–18. 
More than a quarter of households would see a reduction in their Council Tax liability under 
these reforms (Figs 17 and 18). Reductions in Council Tax liabilities would be observed at the 
bottom of the property value distribution, for properties currently in bands A and B. The top 
10% of properties would see a significant increase in their Council Tax charge, with a minimum 
additional annual charge of £3,000. For properties in the top 1% of the distribution, the 
minimum additional charge would be £10,000 annually. Under this system, households at the 
top would be paying the same tax rate as households at the bottom.  
Note, however, that we have not yet accounted for the effect of the reform on property prices. 
We would expect a reform which lowers the tax charged on low value properties, and increases 
the tax charged on high value properties, to lead to a compression in house prices. High value 
properties will be worth less, as any buyer now faces a higher Council Tax charge. Meanwhile, 
the lower Council Tax levied at the bottom of the property distribution would, to some extent, 
be capitalised into higher property values.  
 
33 This implicitly assumes the removal of existing reliefs such as the 25% single-person discount. Adam et 




FIGURE 17: COUNCIL TAX LIABILITY UNDER REFORM 1, BY TAX BAND 
 
Notes: ‘Current tax’ is the average tax liability faced in the tax band across local authorities in England. ‘Reform 1’ is 
a Council Tax reform which charges all properties the rate currently charged at the 24th percentile of the property 
value distribution, which is 0.83%. The maximum (minimum) shows the tax that would be paid by a property at the 
upper (lower) threshold of the band, where applicable. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey, 2016–18; Adam et al. (2020). 
FIGURE 18: COUNCIL TAX LIABILITY UNDER REFORM 2, BY TAX BAND 
 
Notes: ‘Current tax’ is the average tax liability faced in the tax band across local authorities in England. ‘Reform 2’ is 
a Council Tax reform which charges all properties the rate currently charged at the 45th percentile of the property 
value distribution, which is 0.76%. The maximum (minimum) shows the tax that would be paid by a property at the 
upper (lower) threshold of the band, where applicable. 




5.5 Revenues from other taxes 
In this section we provide a brief summary of revenues raised by existing taxes to put our 
revenue estimates and alternative reforms into perspective. We also provide estimates of 
wealth tax receipts in other countries; however we caution that revenue depends heavily on the 
specific structure of the tax (as this paper makes clear), so cross-country comparisons should be 
interpreted with care. 
The UK government raised £828bn in taxes in the 2019/20 tax year (Keep, 2021). An additional 
£250bn in revenue (or £50bn per year over five years) from a one-off wealth tax would have 
increased tax receipts by 30% (6%) in that year; an annual wealth tax raising £10bn would have 
represented a 1.2% increase in total tax receipts. 
The biggest sources of taxation are taxes on income: income tax receipts accounted for £194bn 
in 2019/20, and National Insurance contributions added a further £145bn. Value Added Tax 
(VAT) is the third big source of tax revenue, and raised around £134bn from taxing general 
expenditure. Council Tax contributed £36bn to total public receipts, while (as noted above) 
Capital Gains tax raised £8.8 billion; Inheritance Tax raised just over £5bn in the same year 
(HMRC, 2020e).34  
Current wealth taxes in other countries raise between 0.5% and 4% of total tax revenues 
(Perret, 2021; Chamberlain, 2020). In 2018, the wealth tax raised €1.1bn in Spain, around 0.5% 
of total taxation. The Norwegian wealth tax raised €1.6bn in 2020, approximately 1.1% of total 
tax revenue, and a similar share is raised in France by the IFI (€2.1bn in 2019). The Swiss wealth 
tax generates 3.8% of total tax revenue; Perret (2021) notes that Switzerland has always been 
an outlier in terms of the relative importance of their wealth tax. 
  
 
34 These revenue figures differ slightly from those presented in Sections 5.3 (IHT) and 5.4 (Council Tax), 





We find that a tax rate of 0.17% on wealth above £500,000 would be needed to raise £10 billion 
with a flat annual wealth tax. The same revenue could be generated at higher thresholds with a 
higher tax rate, or by a progressive tax in which those towards the lower end of the wealth 
distribution pay a lower rate, and those at the top end pay a higher rate. Under this tax structure, 
just 0.5% of taxpayers would face liquidity constraints.  
Alternatively, a one-off wealth tax could raise £250 billion in revenue by charging 4.8% on 
wealth above £500,000 (effectively, 0.95% per year, paid over a five-year period), with similar 
possible alternative rates and thresholds. Taxpayers would be more likely to be male, of working 
age, and residents of London and the South East. Under this tax structure, 6.4% of taxpayers – 
526,000 individuals – would face liquidity constraints. 
We also estimate administrative costs to the taxpayer and to the government. Administrative 
costs to taxpayers are estimated at £7.8 billion per year under a tax with a £500,000 threshold, 
and would decrease in aggregate (but increase on a per-taxpayer basis) at higher thresholds, as 
there would be fewer taxpayers but those at the top of the wealth distribution typically hold 
more hard-to-value assets. The cost to the government of setting up the tax would be around 
£580 million, with ongoing costs for a £500,000 exemption threshold estimated at around 
£1.2 billion, again decreasing at higher thresholds.  
A brief comparison shows that it would be possible to raise similar amounts of revenue to an 
annual wealth tax, or more, through reforming existing taxes on capital. These reforms would 
also come at a cost, and would not necessarily avoid some of the challenges imposed by a wealth 
tax, including a need to re-value housing, and high valuation costs for other assets. However, in 
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Appendix A: Tax paid across the wealth distribution  
This section presents evidence on how the average tax rate faced by taxpayers varies by total 
wealth. Figure A1 shows how the average tax rate increases with wealth under each of the 
annual tax structures presented in Table 1. Figures A2 and A3 provide a similar illustration for 
the one-off tax structures presented in Table 4. It is clear that the average tax rate eventually 
converges to the headline marginal rate. The average tax rate appears to increase less rapidly 
than in Figures 2 and 13, where the average tax rate is plotted with wealth percentiles on the X-
axis. This is because the distribution of wealth is heavily skewed to the right. 
FIGURE A1: AVERAGE TAX RATE UNDER AN ANNUAL WEALTH TAX, BY TOTAL CHARGEABLE WEALTH 
 
Notes: The average tax rate is the amount that should be paid at each level of wealth. ‘Total chargeable wealth’ is total 
market wealth excluding low-value items, which are exempted. Tax rates used are as per Table 1. Figure 2 shows the 
average tax rate by wealth percentile. 




FIGURE A2: AVERAGE TAX RATE UNDER A FLAT ONE-OFF WEALTH TAX, BY TOTAL CHARGEABLE WEALTH 
 
Notes: The average tax rate is the amount that should be paid at each level of wealth. ‘Total chargeable wealth’ is total 
market wealth excluding low-value items, which are exempted. Tax rates used are as per Table 4. Figure 13 shows the 
average tax rate by wealth percentile. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
FIGURE A3: AVERAGE TAX RATE UNDER A PROGRESSIVE ONE-OFF WEALTH TAX, BY TOTAL CHARGEABLE 
WEALTH 
 
Notes: The average tax rate is the amount that should be paid at each level of wealth. ‘Total chargeable wealth’ is total 
market wealth excluding low-value items, which are exempted. Tax rates used are as per Table 4. Figure 13 shows the 
average tax rate by wealth percentile. 




Appendix B: Geographical distribution of taxpayers 
In this appendix we show the geographical distribution of taxpayers for different exemption 
thresholds. For a threshold of up to £1 million per individual, taxpayers are heavily concentrated 
in London and the South East. However, when the threshold is set to £5 million, taxpayers are 
evenly spread across a few key regions: the South East (21%), the South West (18%) and the 
North West (16%). London accounts for 13% of taxpayers at this threshold.  
FIGURE B1: GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF TAXPAYERS WITH A £250,000 EXEMPTION THRESHOLD 
 
Notes: This chart shows how taxpayers would be distributed across the country if the tax featured an exemption 
threshold of £250,000. The distribution is independent of the tax rate. Individuals in the Sunday Times Rich List are 
not included in this analysis as we have no information on their region of residence. We have no data for Northern 
Ireland, and so the percentages shown are the percentage of taxpayers in Great Britain living in each region. 





FIGURE B2: GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF TAXPAYERS WITH A £1 MILLION EXEMPTION THRESHOLD 
 
Notes: This chart shows how taxpayers would be distributed across the country if the tax featured an exemption 
threshold of £1,000,000. The distribution is independent of the tax rate. Individuals in the Sunday Times Rich List are 
not included in this analysis as we have no information on their region of residence. We have no data for Northern 
Ireland, and so the percentages shown are the percentage of taxpayers in Great Britain living in each region. 




FIGURE B3: GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF TAXPAYERS WITH A £5 MILLION EXEMPTION THRESHOLD 
 
Notes: This chart shows how taxpayers would be distributed across the country if the tax featured an exemption 
threshold of £5,000,000. The distribution is independent of the tax rate. Individuals in the Sunday Times Rich List are 
not included in this analysis as we have no information on their region of residence. We have no data for Northern 
Ireland, and so the percentages shown are the percentage of taxpayers in Great Britain living in each region. 







Appendix C: Liquidity constrained taxpayers 
This appendix provides the statistics underlying Figures 7, 8 and 14, which show the number and 
share of taxpayers who are liquidity constrained under different tax structures. We also present 
estimates of the share of taxpayers who would be liquidity constrained using alternative 
thresholds to define 'constrained'. 
Lowering the threshold at which an individual is deemed to be liquidity constrained naturally 
increases the share of taxpayers who are constrained for a given tax threshold. An annual wealth 
tax generating £10 billion with a £500,000 threshold would create liquidity constraints for 1% 
of taxpayers when 'liquidity constrained' as defined as having a tax liability in excess of 10% of 
net income and 5% of net income plus liquid wealth (Table C1). This compares to 0.5% using our 
headline cutoff of 20% of net income and 10% of net income plus liquid wealth. Raising the cutoff 
to 40% of net income and 20% of net income plus liquid wealth lowers the share of liquidity 
constrained taxpayers to 0.2%. 
TABLE C1: PERCENTAGE OF TAXPAYERS LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINED UNDER ANNUAL TAXES USING 
ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS, BY RANGE OF NET WEALTH 
Threshold (£) Rate Percentage of taxpayers liquidity constrained by range of total 
wealth  









Flat taxes raising £10bn 
Definition (a) immediate tax liability > 20% net income and > 10% net income plus liquid wealth 
5,000,000 0.90% 20.3%         20.3% 
2,000,000 0.57% 6.3%       3.7% 23.9% 
1,000,000 0.31% 1.6%     0.5% 3.9% 18.2% 
500,000 0.17% 0.5%   0.1% 0.5% 2.2% 13.7% 
250,000 0.12% 0.2% 0.0% 0.1% 0.4% 0.7% 12.8% 
Definition (b) immediate tax liability > 10% net income and > 5% net income plus liquid wealth 
5,000,000 0.90% 25.9%         25.9% 
2,000,000 0.57% 10.9%       6.8% 38.5% 
1,000,000 0.31% 3.2%     0.8% 9.9% 30.4% 
500,000 0.17% 1.1%   0.3% 0.8% 6.3% 20.2% 
250,000 0.12% 0.6% 0.2% 0.4% 0.7% 4.4% 18.2% 
Definition (c) immediate tax liability > 40% net income and > 20% net income plus liquid wealth 
5,000,000 0.90% 13.9%         13.9% 
2,000,000 0.57% 3.4%       1.2% 18.2% 
1,000,000 0.31% 0.7%     0.3% 0.7% 13.0% 
500,000 0.17% 0.2%   0.1% 0.3% 0.3% 5.4% 
250,000 0.12% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.3% 0.3% 3.1% 
Progressive taxes raising £10bn 
Definition (a) immediate tax liability > 20% net income and > 10% net income plus liquid wealth 
Starting at £1,000,000   0.9%     0.1% 1.5% 21.2% 
 
Notes: Under our main specification (definition (a)) an individual is liquidity constrained if their immediate tax liability 
(defined in Section 3.4) exceeds more than 20% of their net income and 10% of their net income plus liquid wealth. 
Alternative specifications (b) and (c) use, respectively, weaker and stronger definitions of liquidity constraints. Tax 




at the top of the WAS, we use their Pareto-adjusted business wealth values, but adjust their net income to maintain 
the same ratio of wealth to income as reported in the WAS. We do not present liquidity analysis using thresholds 
above £5 million due to small sample sizes. 
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey, 2016–18. 
 
TABLE C2: NUMBER OF TAXPAYERS LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINED UNDER ANNUAL TAXES RAISING £10BN IN 
REVENUE, BY RANGE OF NET WEALTH 
Threshold per 
individual (£) 
Rate Number of taxpayers liquidity constrained ('000) by range of 












Flat taxes raising £10bn 
5,000,000 0.90%                   17          17  
2,000,000 0.57%                   40        20  19  
1,000,000 0.31%                   48      12  21  15  
500,000 0.17%                   42    7  12  12  11  
250,000 0.12%                   32  3  5  9  4  10  
Progressive taxes raising £10bn 
Starting at 
£1,000,000                     28      2 8  17  
 
Notes: An individual is liquidity constrained if their immediate tax liability (defined in Section 3.4) exceeds more than 
20% of their net income and 10% of their net income plus liquid wealth. Tax rates used are as per Table 1. Individuals 
in the Sunday Times Rich List are not included in this analysis. For individuals at the top of the WAS, we use their 
Pareto-adjusted business wealth values, but adjust their net income to maintain the same ratio of wealth to income 
as reported in the WAS. We do not present liquidity analysis using thresholds above £5 million due to small sample 
sizes. 
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey, 2016–18. 
 
TABLE C3: PERCENTAGE OF LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINED TAXPAYERS UNDER ONE-OFF TAXES, BY RANGE OF 
WEALTH 
Threshold (£) Annualised 
rate 
Percentage of taxpayers liquidity constrained by range of 
total wealth  











Flat tax at 5% 
5,000,000 1% 21.3%         21.3% 
2,000,000 1% 10.0%       6.3% 35.0% 
1,000,000 1% 5.8%     1.5% 19.7% 40.2% 
500,000 1% 7.0%   1.6% 12.7% 27.6% 41.1% 
250,000 1% 8.2% 1.1% 9.3% 21.1% 29.9% 41.1% 
Flat taxes raising £250bn 
5,000,000 4.71% 38.4%         38.4% 
2,000,000 3.05% 24.5%       20.1% 53.8% 
1,000,000 1.70% 11.2%     5.6% 31.1% 45.1% 
500,000 0.95% 6.4%   1.4% 11.4% 26.7% 40.1% 
250,000 0.64% 3.4% 0.5% 2.8% 9.1% 19.1% 32.0% 
Progressive taxes raising £250bn 
Starting at 





£1,000,000   5.6%     0.9% 20.7% 41.7% 
 
Notes: An individual is liquidity constrained if their immediate tax liability (defined in Section 3.4) exceeds more than 
20% of their net income and 10% of their net income plus liquid wealth. Tax rates used are as per Table 4, where we 
target £250bn in revenue under each tax structure. Individuals in the Sunday Times Rich List are not included in this 
analysis. For individuals at the top of the WAS, we use their Pareto-adjusted business wealth values, but adjust their 
net income to maintain the same ratio of wealth to income as reported in the WAS. We do not present liquidity 
analysis using thresholds above £5 million due to small sample sizes. 
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey, 2016–18. 
 
 
TABLE C4: NUMBER OF LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINED TAXPAYERS UNDER ONE-OFF TAXES, BY RANGE OF 
WEALTH 
Threshold (£) Annualised 
rate 
Number of taxpayers liquidity constrained ('000) by range 
of total wealth 











Flat tax at 5% 
5,000,000 1%  17              17  
2,000,000 1% 63        35      29  
1,000,000 1% 176      36  108      33  
500,000 1% 575    85  305  151      34  
250,000 1% 1,269  83  482  506  164      34  
Flat taxes raising £250bn 
5,000,000 4.71% 31              31  
2,000,000 3.05% 154        110      44  
1,000,000 1.70% 341      134  170      37  
500,000 0.95% 526    74  274  146      33  
250,000 0.64% 528  36  143  218  105      26  
Progressive taxes raising £250bn 
Starting at 
£500,000   
              
369    
            
28  
       
164  
       
144      34  
Starting at 
£1,000,000   
               
169      
         
22  
       
113      34  
 
Notes: An individual is liquidity constrained if their immediate tax liability (defined in Section 3.4) exceeds more than 
20% of their net income and 10% of their net income plus liquid wealth. Tax rates used are as per Table 4, where we 
target £250bn in revenue under each tax structure. Individuals in the Sunday Times Rich List are not included in this 
analysis. For individuals at the top of the WAS, we use their Pareto-adjusted business wealth values, but adjust their 
net income to maintain the same ratio of wealth to income as reported in the WAS. We do not present liquidity 
analysis using thresholds above £5 million due to small sample sizes. 
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey, 2016–18. 
 
TABLE C5: ALTERNATIVE LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINT DEFINITION: IMMEDIATE TAX LIABILITY > 10% OF NET 
INCOME AND > 5% OF NET INCOME PLUS LIQUID WEALTH 
Threshold (£) Annualised 
rate 
Percentage of taxpayers liquidity constrained by range of total 
wealth  















5,000,000 1% 27.0%         27.0% 
2,000,000 1% 18.2%       14.8% 41.7% 
1,000,000 1% 13.9%     7.6% 36.7% 46.3% 
500,000 1% 18.3%   8.7% 32.2% 44.9% 46.3% 
250,000 1% 21.1% 5.7% 30.9% 40.1% 47.7% 46.3% 
Flat taxes raising £250bn 
5,000,000 4.71% 50.2%         50.2% 
2,000,000 3.05% 34.6%       30.2% 64.0% 
1,000,000 1.70% 22.7%     15.9% 47.8% 56.9% 
500,000 0.95% 17.2%   7.8% 30.5% 43.9% 46.3% 
250,000 0.64% 12.1% 2.2% 15.6% 27.4% 37.4% 43.3% 
 
Notes: In this alternative specification, an individual is liquidity constrained if their immediate tax liability (defined in 
Section 3.4) exceeds more than 10% of their net income and 5% of their net income plus liquid wealth. Tax rates used 
are as per Table 4, where we target £250bn in revenue under each tax structure. Individuals in the Sunday Times Rich 
List are not included in this analysis. For individuals at the top of the WAS, we use their Pareto-adjusted business 
wealth values, but adjust their net income to maintain the same ratio of wealth to income as reported in the WAS. We 
do not present liquidity analysis using thresholds above £5 million due to small sample sizes. 
Source: ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey, 2016–18. 
 
TABLE C6: ALTERNATIVE LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINT DEFINITION: IMMEDIATE TAX LIABILITY > 40% OF NET 
INCOME AND > 20% OF NET INCOME PLUS LIQUID WEALTH 
Threshold (£) Annualised 
rate 
Percentage of taxpayers liquidity constrained by range of total 
wealth  











Flat tax at 5% 
5,000,000 1% 14.5%         14.5% 
2,000,000 1% 5.8%       3.3% 22.7% 
1,000,000 1% 2.3%     0.5% 6.5% 27.0% 
500,000 1% 1.9%   0.5% 1.9% 11.0% 27.2% 
250,000 1% 1.9% 0.3% 1.2% 4.8% 13.4% 28.2% 
Flat taxes raising £250bn 
5,000,000 4.71% 30.9%         30.9% 
2,000,000 3.05% 14.7%       10.9% 40.5% 
1,000,000 1.70% 4.7%     1.1% 15.4% 37.1% 
500,000 0.95% 1.7%   0.5% 1.8% 9.7% 27.0% 
250,000 0.64% 0.8% 0.2% 0.6% 1.4% 6.3% 20.2% 
 
Notes: In this alternative specification, an individual is liquidity constrained if their immediate tax liability (defined in 
Section 3.4) exceeds more than 40% of their net income and 20% of their net income plus liquid wealth. Tax rates used 
are as per Table 4, where we target £250bn in revenue under each tax structure. Individuals in the Sunday Times Rich 
List are not included in this analysis. For individuals at the top of the WAS, we use their Pareto-adjusted business 
wealth values, but adjust their net income to maintain the same ratio of wealth to income as reported in the WAS. We 
do not present liquidity analysis using thresholds above £5 million due to small sample sizes. 





Appendix D: IHT reform 
In this section we present our revenue estimates for the Inheritance Tax (IHT) reforms 
described in Section 5.3 when we allow for avoidance responses. We base our modelling of 
avoidance responses on empirical estimates of the elasticity of taxable wealth with respect to 
the net-of-tax rate for IHT, which are in the range 0.1–0.2 (Kopczuk, 2013). These estimates 
suggest that a 1% reduction in the share of the estate that would be passed on after tax would 
lead to a 0.1–0.2% reduction in the size of the estate after behavioural responses, on average. 
We take the upper bound of these estimates. However, it is not clear how, or to what extent, 
individuals would respond to these reforms, since they shut off some of the channels currently 
used to avoid the tax. We therefore expect the avoidance response to be smaller than this 
statistic suggests.  
For each individual, we apply the elasticity to the percentage change in the net-of-average tax 
rate they face under the reformed system relative to the existing system. Note that some of the 
reforms we propose lead to a reduction in the tax rate faced by some individuals. As a result, we 
expect some individuals to increase their taxable wealth in response to the reform – i.e. pass on 
more wealth, while others will reduce their taxable wealth. It is therefore not obvious from the 
outset that the reforms we suggest should have a negative effect on taxable wealth through 
behavioural responses, overall.  
Accounting for behavioural responses in this way has little effect on our revenue estimates 
(Table D1). Under no reform is the amount of revenue reduced by more than £200 million.  










Current IHT tax base               25  
           
583,400  
         
0.40  
           
4.4  
                          
36  
adding pension wealth                37  
           
583,400  
         
0.40  
           
6.1  
                          
54  
adding business wealth               25  
           
583,400  
         
0.40  
           
5.3  
                          
41  
adding pension and 
business wealth               37  
           
583,400  
         
0.40  
           
6.9  
                          
59  
Raising the threshold               25  
           
698,934  
         
0.40  
           
5.6  
                          
40  
Reducing the rate               37  
           
583,400  
         
0.25  
           
4.5  
                          
59  
 
Notes: In this table we assume an elasticity of taxable wealth with respect to the net-of-tax rate of 0.2. ‘Current IHT 
tax base’ shows our stylised model of the current IHT system. The ‘effective threshold’ is the amount of wealth 
required to be among the taxpaying population. The revenue calculation is the rate applied to total wealth above the 
effective threshold. ‘Adding pension wealth’ adds pensions to the current tax base, according to their inherited value, 
keeping the effective threshold fixed. ‘Adding business wealth’ adds businesses and unlisted shares to the current tax 
base, keeping the effective threshold fixed. ‘Adding pensions and business wealth’ combines the previous two 
reforms. ‘Raising the threshold’ takes the tax base as inclusive of all assets (pensions and business wealth included) 
and raises the threshold to maintain the same number of taxpayers as the current IHT system. ‘Reducing the rate’ 
calculates the rate required to generate the same amount of revenue as the ‘current’ IHT system (our model), from 
the same number of taxpayers, with a comprehensive tax base.  








Appendix E: Impact of narrowing the tax base 
Throughout this report we have examined revenue estimates based on a comprehensive tax 
base – that is, including all wealth in the base of taxable assets, with only a few exemptions for 
some low-value items as described in Section 2.1. This is consistent with the recommendation 
Advani, Chamberlain and Summers (2020b), as it will prevent arbitrary inequalities in the tax 
burden being generated across taxpayers who happen to have different asset mixes, and help to 
limit avoidance through taxpayers changing their asset mix. 
In this appendix we present estimates of the revenue that would be lost by exempting major 
asset classes from the tax base (Table E1). These are compared to a 100% benchmark which 
represents revenue raised from a comprehensive wealth tax starting at a given threshold. The 
percentage lost from exempting assets is independent of the rates charged above this 
threshold.35 These revenue loss estimates vary according to the exemption threshold, as the 
asset mix of taxpayers changes across the distribution. For example, at thresholds of £500,000 
or below, more than half of revenue which could be raised with a comprehensive tax base would 
be lost if pension assets were exempted. By contrast, at thresholds of £2 million or more, the 
exemption of business assets would have a larger impact, as business wealth becomes a more 
dominant part of taxpayers' asset mix. 
It is worth explicitly noting that the numbers in Table E1 are not equivalent to the share of total 
wealth that is held in the form of the relevant asset by those taxpayers. The asset class 
exemption takes a ‘slice’ off the top of the taxpayer's taxable wealth (of which it comprises a 
larger proportion), so that the full impact of the exemption works through the taxpayer's 
marginal tax rate rather than the average tax rate. 
TABLE E1: REVENUE LOSS FROM EXEMPTING ASSETS 
  Share of revenue lost by excluding…       







250,000 31% 38% 54% 16% 17% 2% 
500,000 30% 37% 54% 23% 19% 2% 
1,000,000 25% 34% 43% 39% 20% 2% 
2,000,000 15% 23% 20% 64% 17% 1% 
5,000,000 7% 13% 5% 86% 9% 0% 
10,000,000 3% 6% 1% 94% 4% 0% 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey, 2016–18. 
  
 




Appendix F: Value of household contents 
In our main analysis, we exclude the value of household contents from the tax base. As discussed 
in Section 2.1, we expect that most items worth more than £3000 (below which a de minimis 
exemption applies) will be included under “collectibles and valuables” or “vehicles”. However, it 
is possible that some household appliances, items of furniture, and electronic devices, are worth 
more than £3000. To assess the potential magnitude of this issue, we use eBay sales data to 
analyse the price of a range of household goods that we think are likely to be included under 
household contents. This enables us to obtain data on the sale price of new and used items. 
The relevant valuation concept for a wealth tax is market value—the price for which household 
goods could be sold. We can use the “used” price as a proxy for market value, and the “new” price 
as the replacement cost. Typically, the replacement cost will exceed market value. However, 
eBay sales data suffer from a selection problem: there is a fixed cost to selling goods, and 
individuals will only sell used goods if the expected price is enough to compensate for the hassle 
and financial cost of selling. Moreover, used goods which are in poor condition will be less likely 
to sell, which may mean that cheaper models of new items are less likely to be re-sold. To 
minimise selection issues and create a fairer comparison of replacement cost and market value, 
we compare narrowly-defined items. First, we search for items within narrowly-defined eBay 
sub-categories. For instance, rather than search “washing machine” under “All Categories”, we 
search within the “Washing Machines” sub-category of “Appliances”, which should avoid 
including items such as washing machine parts, which may be more likely to sell new than used. 
Second, we compare same brands, choosing the top three selling brands for each item. This 
should ensure that we compare items of a similar quality. 
Table F1 shows that both the replacement cost and market value of these household goods is 
well below the £3000 cutoff. The vast majority of items sell for less than £3000 even when new. 
While some households will own household goods worth more than £3000, this is likely to be 
just a tiny fraction of what is included under household contents by WAS respondents, noting 
that individuals are already asked separately about vehicles, collectibles and valuables. 
Including household contents has a small effect on our revenue estimates. We estimate the 
impact of including household contents valued at 40% of their replacement cost. This is based 
on a weighted average of the market value to replacement cost ratios reported for common 
household items in Table F1, where items are weighted by their average price when new. It is 
possible that this overestimates the market value of household contents, since smaller items 
such as clothing are likely to have little resale value. Using a ratio of 40% should therefore give 
a reasonable upper bound on the revenue effects. We estimate that including household 
contents increases the revenue that could be raised from an annual tax with a £500,000 
threshold and a rate of 0.16% from £10 billion to £10.2 billion. A one-off tax charging 5% on 
wealth above £500,000 could raise £269 billion if household contents were included, compared 
to £263 billion if not. The higher the threshold, the smaller the revenue gain from including 
household contents, since household contents represent a small fraction of the wealth of richer 
households (Advani, Bangham and Leslie, 2021).   
TABLE F1: VALUE OF HOUSEHOLD GOODS 
Item (% of new items sold for > £3000) 
 Average new price  Average used price 
(replacement cost)  (market value)  




Dishwasher (0%)     
Cookology £207.28 £84.26 
Essentials £175.03 £56.87 
Bosch £360.11 £71.35 
Fridge (tall) (0%)     
Sia £130.49 £51.92 
Russell Hobbs £115.59 £44.30 
Bush £132.91 £57.11 
Freezer (0%)     
Cookology £155.38 £48.69 
Bush £143.35 £69.81 
Essentials £127.87 £56.45 
Washing machine (0%)     
Beko £209.75 £53.53 
Indesit £201.74 £50.76 
Hotpoint £249.37 £55.58 
Tumble dryer (0%)     
Beko £220.40 £60.74 
Candy £221.02 £65.42 
Hoover £229.19 £68.93 
Oven (0.01%)     
Cookology £268.31 £72.24 
Hotpoint £226.84 £59.58 
MyAppliances £159.15 £50.45 
Hob (0%)     
Cookology £122.02 £48.18 
Sia £123.52 £41.07 
MyAppliances £113.11 £20.43 
Electronics     
Television (0.08%)     
Sharp £219.87 £71.15 
LG £404.84 £117.16 
Sony £453.45 £93.59 
Laptop (0.03%)     
Lenovo £383.91 £177.37 
HP £404.33 £152.56 
ASUS £408.33 £203.58 
PC desktop (0.1%)     
Intel £288.51 £213.96 
Dell £286.54 £101.20 
Apple £556.29 £309.95 
Games console (0.01%)     
Microsoft £479.56 £112.29 
Sony £382.24 £116.34 
Nintendo £168.37 £80.27 
Furniture     




Homcom £173.61 £76.51 
Cloud Nine £135.71 £70.46 
Chesterfield £701.91 £330.06 
Dining table and chairs (set) (0%)     
Corona £146.19 £56.14 
Julian Bowen £197.14 £61.47 
Double bed (0%)     
Be&D £186.41 £65.08 
hOme £116.41 £75.75 
Panana £92.53 £68.50 
Desk (0%)     
Homcom £78.35 £36.76 
IKEA £59.58 £36.58 
Argos £66.48 £21.85 
Wardrobe (0%)     
Argos £161.93 £37.72 
Funime £18.60 £19.10 
Corona £165.45 £56.69 
Garden patio set (0%)     
Outsunny £236.27 £146.97 
Abreo £382.04 £290.69 
Panana £229.92 £123.05 
 
Notes: Average sale price for “new” and “used” items sold to UK buyers on eBay in the year to April 2021. The 
percentage of new items that sold for > £3000 includes all brands of the item. For each item, the top three best-selling 
brands are selected based on sales of new items.  





Appendix G: Equal split of assets 
In this section we illustrate the revenue effects of households splitting their (non-pension) 
assets equally between spouses. Table G1 illustrates the revenue that would be raised with the 
headline rates presented in Table 1 under three alternative scenarios. The first is a situation in 
which wealth is retained by the individual who reports ownership of each asset in the WAS, with 
no other behavioural response. The second is a situation in which couples split all assets equally, 
with the exception of pensions which cannot typically be transferred. For comparison, we also 
report the revenue estimates from our 'low avoidance' scenario, which takes into account the 
entire range of response margins individuals could engage in (see Section 3.1 for details). 




Revenue (no avoidance) Low 
avoidance 
(Table 1) 
Wealth retained by 
current owner 
Equal splitting of 
wealth exc. Pensions 
Flat taxes 
10,000,000  1.12% 10.1  10.0  10.0 
5,000,000  0.90%                         10.1  10.0  10.0 
2,000,000  0.57%                         10.2  10.0  10.0 
1,000,000  0.31%                         10.4  10.1  10.0 
500,000  0.17%                         10.7  10.0  10.0 
250,000  0.12%                         10.9  10.2  10.0 
Progressive taxes 
1,000,000 0.10% 





Notes: Tax rates are taken from Table 1, for an annual wealth tax which raises £10bn under a ‘low avoidance’ 
scenario. ‘Wealth retained by current owner’ assigns the value of assets to the household member who reports 
owning them. ‘Equal splitting of wealth exc. Pensions’ divides household assets (excluding pensions) equally 
between spouses.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ONS, Wealth and Assets Survey, 2016–18. 
 
